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THE PRACTICE AND DISCOURSE OF 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Edward L. Rubin* 
This Article is an attempt to evaluate the enterprise of legal schol-
arship. It might appear that an enormous amount has been written 
about the subject in recent years, but the majority of the discussions 
actually focus on the law itself, on legal theory, or on the validity of 
new approaches, such as law and economics, law and literature, and 
critical legal studies. The concern here is the remainder - that great 
mass of work that discusses contemporary legal issues in a manner 
that is difficult to describe but easy to recognize. 1 It can be referred to, 
without any implicit condemnation, as standard legal scholarship. 
These are not cheerful times for standard legal scholarship. In 
fact, the field is widely perceived as being in a state of disarray. It 
seems to lack a unified purpose, a coherent methodology, a sense of 
forward motion, and a secure link to its past traditions. It is bedeviled 
by a gnawing sense that it should adopt the methods of other disci-
plines but it is uncertain how the process is to be accomplished. The 
field even lacks a conceptual framework within which to criticize 
itself. 
One reasonable way to develop such a framework is to rely upon 
the same approach that has been used to reevaluate other forms of 
scholarship. In fact, the reevaluation of scholarship has been a central 
theme in twentieth-century thought. Its most consistent development 
is to be found in continental philosophy: the phenomenology of 
Husserl,2 Schutz,3 and Merleau-Ponty,4 the linguistic analysis of the 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to Richard Buxbaum, 
William Fletcher, Richard Hyland, Sanford Kadish, Robert Weisberg and Franklin Zimring for 
reading and commenting on various versions of this Article, and to the participants in Berkeley's 
Jurisprudence and Social Policy seminar, where one version was presented. 
1. A more precise description can only be given once the framework of analysis is presented, 
for reasons stated in the text at notes 21-41 infra. To anticipate, standard legal scholarship 
adopts a prescriptive approach, see text at notes 45-49 infra, is grounded on normative positions, 
see text at notes 52-56 infra, and is expressed in judicial discourse, see text at notes 74-85 infra. 
2. The work that deals most directly with the problem of scholarship is E. HUSSERL, THE 
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (D. Carr trans. 
1970) [hereinafter HUSSERL, EUROPEAN SCIENCES]. 
3. A. SCHUTZ, CoLLECTED PAPERS (1962) [hereinafter SCHUTZ, PAPERS]. 
4. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (C. Smith trans. 1962). 
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later Wittgenstein, 5 followed by Peter Winch, 6 A.R. Louch, 7 and, in 
some sense Thomas Kuhn,8 the hermeneutics of Heidegger,9 
Ricoeur, 10 and Gadamer, 11 the critical theory of the Frankfurt 
School12 and Habermas13 and, to some extent, the poststructuralism of 
Foucault14 and Derrida.15 A somewhat related strand is American 
pragmatism as developed by Pierce,16 Dewey17 and James, 18 and, re-
cently, to some extent, Richard Rorty. 19 Although these approaches 
vary greatly among themselves, their analysis of scholarship has cer-
5. L. Wl'ITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. Ger-
man and English 1968) [hereinafter Wl'ITGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS]. See note 26 infra. 
6. P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE (1958); Winch, Understanding a Primitive 
Society, 1 AM. PHIL. Q. 307 (1964). 
7. A. LoUCH, EXPLANATION AND HUMAN ACTION (1969). 
8. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1st ed. 1962) [hereinafter 
KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS]; Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE 
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970) [hereinafter Kuhn, 
Reflections]. 
9. M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 29-31, 67-77 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans. 
1962) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME]; M. HEIDEGGER, Modern Science, Metaphys-
ics, and Mathematics, in BASIC WRmNGS 247 (D. Krell ed. 1977) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, 
Modern Science]; M. HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in id. at 287 [hereinafter 
HEIDEGGER, Technology]. The explicit analysis of scholarship in Being and Time is relatively 
brief, but the book's emphasis on everyday human experience and the primacy of preempirical 
knowledge was extremely influential in the reevaluation of scholarship. 
10. P. RICOEUR, THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS 3-96 (D. Ihde ed. 1974) [hereinafter 
RICOEUR, INTERPRETATIONS]; Ricoeur, The Model of the Text, 38 Soc. RES. 529 (1971) [herein-
after Ricoeur, The Model of the Text]. 
11. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH AND 
METHOD]. 
12. See, e.g .. M. HORKHEIMER, CRmCAL THEORY (1972) [hereinafter HORKHEIMER, CRIT· 
!CAL THEORY]; M. HORKHEIMER, THE EcLIPSE OF REASON (1974) [hereinafter HORKHEIMER, 
EcLIPSE]; M. HORKHEIMER & T. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1972); H. MAR· 
CUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964). 
13. Most particularly, J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (T. Mc-
Carthy trans. 1981) [hereinafter HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION]; J. HABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (J. Shapiro trans. 1971) [hereinafter HABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE]. 
14. Most notably, Michel Foucault, at least to the extent that the term does not include 
deconstruction. The problem of scholarship is most central in M. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOL· 
OGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1972) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY]. But it is discussed at 
length in his other works as well. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195-308 
(1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE]. 
15. See J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans. 1976) [hereinafter DERRIDA, 
GRAMMATOLOGY]; J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (A. Bass trans. 1978) [hereinafter 
DERRIDA, WRITING]. The reasons for the qualification with respect to Foucault and Derrida are 
discussed in notes 35, 36 & 39 infra. 
16. 5 c. PIERCE, COLLECTED PAPERS: PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM (C. Hartshorne 
& P. Weiss eds. 1934). 
17. J. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (1926); J. DEWEY, EsSAYS IN EXPERIMENTAL 
Lome (1953). 
18. W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1947); see also W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE (1897). 
19. R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). 
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tain common themes, which will be referred to here as the critique of 
methodology. 
Continental philosophy has influenced a number of movements in 
legal scholarship, including the critical legal studies movement, the 
law and literature movement, and a more recent movement that can be 
called law as practical reason.20 But the major concerns of all three 
movements have been legal theory and the law itself, not the analysis 
oflegal scholarship. To be sure, one can discern what the members of 
these movements think of standard scholarship, but indirect skepti-
cism or condemnation is quite different from sustained analysis. More 
importantly, there is no need for indirection; since one of the major 
strands of continental philosophy, the critique of methodology, is cen-
trally concerned with scholarly activity, it can be applied directly to 
the problem of legal scholarship, rather than being refracted through 
an analysis of law and legal institutions. 
The present Article is an effort to use the central insights devel-
oped by the critique of methodology in assessing standard legal schol-
arship. Interestingly, this assessment suggests that the negative 
elements of the critique, which have struck telling blows against the 
self-satisfied certainty of natural and social science, are largely inappli-
cable to legal scholarship. But the general approach to scholarship 
that the critique of methodology advances can be used to formulate an 
independent critique, based on the internally defined purposes of the 
scholarship itself. The critique can then be reapplied to provide con-
structive, and essentially pragmatic methods for resolving some of the 
problems that currently beset the entire field. Not only does this offer 
prospects for improving legal scholarship, but it suggests that this ef-
fort is an unusually important one. The critique reveals that legal 
scholarship is not simply a subject for assessment, but also a crucial 
element in the assessment of other academic disciplines. It is through 
law, as much as through epistemology, that we determine the social 
role and purpose of these disciplines. 
The logical way to begin this discussion might appear to be a de-
20. One important contemporary mode of scholarship for which the critique of methodology 
does not provide a basis is law and economics. Law and economics is largely positivist in its 
conception, and thus represents an opposing approach to that of the critique. In fact, economic 
methodology has been vigorously attacked by those who share the critique's perspective. See H. 
ICATOUZIAN, IDEOLOGY AND METHOD IN EcONOMICS (1980); D. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETO· 
RIC OF EcONOMICS (1985); Schumpeter, Science and Ideology, 39 AM. EcoN. REV. 345 (1949). 
For related attacks on law and economics, see Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, 
and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 668 (1979); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Leff, Economic Analysis 
of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). The place of law and 
economics in legal scholarship is discussed in text at notes 152-58 infra. 
1838 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1835 
scription or characterization of standard legal scholarship. But that 
would immediately violate the principles developed by the critique of 
methodology itself, which holds that something cannot be described 
without implicating the conceptual framework on which the descrip-
tion is based. To describe standard legal scholarship, one must know 
the aspects of it that should be described, and the terms in which to 
describe them. This Article, therefore, begins by discussing the cri-
tique of methodology, and then describes standard legal scholarship 
according to the terms of that critique. As it proceeds, the description 
is elaborated through further development of the theory. In effect, 
then, the description is not complete until the analysis is complete; one 
cannot fully know what is being described until one has identified its 
defects and decided how those defects should be remedied. This 
makes sense, because a socially relevant critique must emerge from the 
subject matter, and the subject should not be regarded as fully de-
scribed unless one has described its problems, and its prospects for 
improvement. 
Thus, the Article begins with a discussion of the critique of meth-
odology, a characterization of standard legal scholarship in terms of 
the critique, and an exploration of the critique's relevance for this 
form of scholarship. The next section discusses the modes of legal 
analysis represented by the critical legal studies, law and literature, 
and law as practical reason movements, which draw from many of the 
same philosophic sources as the critique. Despite their common ori-
gin, these movements do not rely on the critique of methodology itself, 
and do not focus on standard legal scholarship. The Article then pro-
ceeds to offer a critique based on the internally defined purposes of 
legal scholarship, concluding that this scholarship is often ineffective 
on its own terms. Finally, the insights of the critique of methodology 
are used to develop a set of practical suggestions for increasing the 
field's effectiveness in achieving those self-defined purposes. 
I. STANDARD LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CRITIQUE OF 
METHODOLOGY 
A. The Critique of Methodology 
The body of thought that is referred to here as the critique of 
methodology21 is enormously varied and complex, resisting either 
21. "Methodology," in this phrase, means any independent, systematic set of arguments or 
criteria which claims to arrive at a true or accurate account of the subject matter under consider-
ation. Its use, as a defining characteristic of the mode of thought that modem continental philos-
ophy opposes, is taken mainly from P. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (1975), and 
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 414-47. 
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summary or paraphrase. One common element, however, is its attack 
on positivism, and more generally its attack on the claims of objectiv-
ity that have been advanced by a broad range of academic disciplines. 
Such claims were rather fashionable as recently as half a century ago. 
Natural scientists believed that they were accurately describing physi-
cal reality and discovering its underlying regularities, while social 
scientists - particularly economists and political scientists - believed 
that they were describing with similar, if more modest accuracy, the 
behavior of human beings and the operation of human society. His-
torians viewed themselves as developing an account of what had really 
happened in the past, and literary critics felt that they were discover-
ing the real, and generally intended, meanings that lay embedded in 
literary texts. All these scholars rec9gnized that their state of knowl-
edge was incomplete, and all, with the possible exception of natural 
scientists, acknowledged that this would always be the case. Nonethe-
less, the claims to objective description on which they based their 
work seemed irresistibly persuasive at the time. In fact, such claims 
survive to this day as working assumptions in most of these fields. 22 
Positivist philosophy, or logical positivism, which flourished in the 
1920s and 1930s, was built on these self-confident foundations. Prior 
to its appearance, the philosophic treatment of empirical knowledge, 
at least in continental Europe, had been dominated by idealism, which 
regarded empirical knowledge as a grimy, janitorial affair, far removed 
from the true knowledge of the mind, the spirit, and the Absolute.23 
The positivist response was that the only true knowledge of the natural 
world was empirical, consisting of knowledge that could be verified by 
experience. Transcendental philosophy, they claimed, was a series of 
impressionistic assertions that were endlessly elaborated without lead-
ing in any particular direction, an artifact of language, combining 
words in startling or pleasing patterns to express the personal opinions 
of the philosopher. In other words, it was, as the positivists gently 
pointed out, Absolute nonsense. 24 
This emphasis on language proved, in part, to be the positivists' 
22. See generally R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THE-
ORY 3-31 (1978) (discussing the development of empirical theory in the social sciences). 
23. The most influential proponent of this view was Hegel; see G. HEGEL, THE PHENOME-
NOLOGY OF MIND (J. Baillie trans. 2d ed. 1931); see also J. FICHTE, THE SCIENCE OF KNOWL-
EDGE (1889); A. SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA (R. Haldane & J. Kemp 
trans. 6th ed. 1907). See generally, J. ROYCE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1892). 
24. See, e.g., A. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND Lome (2d ed. 1946); R. CARNAP, PHILOS-
OPHY AND LoGICAL SYNTAX (1935); R. VON MISES, POSITIVISM: A STUDY IN HUMAN UN-
DERSTANDING (1951). On the general history and development of this movement see J. 
JOERGENSEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LoGICAL EMPIRICISM 2 International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science No. 9 (1951); v. KRAFT, THE VIENNA CIRCLE (1953). 
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undoing. As their critics,25 and at least one of their own number, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein,26 soon recognized, positivist claims were also 
couched in language, and could be just as readily described as 
nonempirical expressions of a viewpoint. The modem critique of 
methodology went further, however, by combining this epistemologi-
cal insight with social theory and speculative philosophy. It is not 
only the theory of knowledge that is couched in language, the critique 
suggested, but knowledge itself, including all the allegedly empirical 
disciplines. Language, moreover, is intertwined with personal and cul-
tural experience, so that these disciplines are products of that experi-
ence as well. The problems people perceive, the categories they 
establish, the hypotheses they generate, the methodologies they em-
ploy, the arguments they use, and the criteria of validity they accept 
are all specific choices, made in the midst of history, as part of ongoing 
intellectual traditions. In fact, our very perception of reality, the 
things "out there" that empirical disciplines believe themselves to be 
describing, is also a product of our thought processes, and possibly our 
language. There is disagreement among the proponents of this cri-
tique about whether some transcendent or inherent structures unify all 
human consciousness.27 But they generally agree that there is no uni-
form, objective referent by which we can determine whether our 
thought patterns are right or wrong. Rather, our sense of reality is 
determined by those thought patterns, by the cognitive constructs that 
make thinking possible. It is these constructs, which exist within our 
25. See, e.g., w. ALSrON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1964); B. BLANSHARD, REASON 
AND ANALYSIS (1962); J. WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1953); Wisdom, Met-
aphysics and Verification Pt. J, 1938 MIND 452. 
26. Wittgenstein began as a logical positivist of sorts. See L. WnTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS 
Lomco-PHILOSOPHICUS (D. Pears & B. McGuinness trans. 1961). This work was certainly cen-
tral in the development of the Vienna Circle. See J. HARTNACK, WITTGENSTEIN AND MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY 43-57 (1965); J. URMSON, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: ITS DEVELOPMENT BE· 
TWEEN THE Two WORLD WARS 99-129 (1956). Wittgenstein's shift to linguistic philosophy is 
presented in L. WmGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS supra note 5, a book whose influence was felt 
as a result of Wittgenstein's, lectures at Cambridge. These lectures were published, also posthu-
mously, as L. WllTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS (1958). 
27. Husserl advances the idea of a transcendental unity, see HUSSERL, EUROPEAN SCIENCES, 
supra note 2; E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS (D. Cairns trans. 1977) [hereinafter HUS-
SERL, MEDITATIONS]. Derrida and Wittgenstein treat human thought as a culturally particular-
ized phenomenon. See J. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (1973); L. WITTGENSTEIN, 
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 2-172. On the relationship between the two, and their joint 
response to Husserl's phenomenology, see H. STATEN, WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984). 
Hermeneutic writers generally attempt to mediate between these positions. See GADAMER, 
TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 345-446; HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra note 9, 
at 91-148, 225-72. More generally, however, it can be said that all the thinkers discussed here are 
attempting different approaches to this same mediation. Husserl, for example is insistent on the 
significance of culturally determined versions of the lifeworld, see HUSSERL, EUROPEAN SCI· 
ENCES, supra note 2, at 103-89, while Wittgenstein focuses on the general features of culturally 
determined rules. 
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minds or within our culture, that must be explored to achieve either 
understanding or wisdom. 2s 
According to the critique of methodology, an academic discipline 
is not a body of objective information, or a set of techniques for dis-
covering such information, but a practice; a system of socially consti-
tuted modes of argument shared by a community of scholars.29 The 
defining characteristic of a practice, in contrast to a methodology, is 
that its determinations of validity ultimately must be made on the ba-
sis of judgment, and perhaps intuition, rather than according to fixed 
rules. Being based on judgment, a practice is necessarily embedded in 
a culture and a language. 30 As a result, the conclusions that any 
scholarly discipline produces are bounded by a cultural horizon that is 
28. See generally P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CoNSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
(1967); DERRIDA, WRITING, supra note 15, at 31-63, 278-93; FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra 
note 14, at 21-76; GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 153-341; c. GEERTZ, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973) [hereinafter GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION]; HABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 67-186; J. HABERMAS, Technology and Science as "Ideology': in 
TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 81 (1971); HORKHEIMER, CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 
253-72; HUSSERL, EUROPEAN SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 67-135; KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS supra note 8, at43-51, 110-34; A. LOUCH, supra note 7, at 50-60; 1 SCHUTZ, PAPERS supra 
note 3, at 3-66; c. TAYLOR, THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR (1964); p. WINCH, supra note 6, 
at 7-65; WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS supra note 5, at 56-88; Geertz, Blurred Genres: The 
Refrigeration of Social Thought, 49 AM. SCHOLAR 165 (1980); Taylor, Interpretation and the 
Sciences of Man, 25 REv. METAPHYSICS 3 (1971). A major figure in this general intellectual 
movement is Max Weber, but his position can be described as unclear, or more respectfully, as 
multi-faceted. See R. BENDIX, MAX WEBER (1962); HABERMAS, CoMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 
supra note 13, at 143-271; A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 11-14 (1983); w. RUNCIMAN, A CRI-
TIQUE OF MAX WEBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (1972); A. SCHUTZ, THE PHENOM-
ENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert trans. 1967); P. WINCH, supra note 6, 
at 45-51; Parsons, Value-Freedom and Objectivity in MAX WEBER AND SOCIOLOGY TODAY 27 
(0. Stammer ed. 1971). 
29. See, e.g., R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM, 109-18, 223-29 
(1983); M. FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 199-217 (1977) [hereinafter 
FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE]; GEERTZ, supra note 28 at 3-30; H. GADAMER, What is Practice?: The 
Conditions of Social Reason, in REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 80 (1981); GADAMER, TRUTH 
AND METHOD, supra note 11, at 274-89; J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE (J. Viertel 
trans. 1973); HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 295-319; w. JAMES, 
PRAGMATISM, supra note 18, at 197-217; KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS supra note 8, at 110-
34; A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 169-89 (1981); R. RORTY, supra note 19. 
30. The linguistic nature of scholarly research, and of thought in general, is clearly a domi-
nant theme in modern philosophy, and one that is not restricted to hermeneutics or linguistic 
analysis. For particularly definitive statements, see J. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 
15, at 3-57; FOUCAULT, ARCHEOLOGY supra note 14, at 79-131; GADAMER, TRUTH AND 
METHOD supra note 11, at 345-447; J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 
94-101, 366-99; M. HEIDEGGER, ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE (1971); RICOEUR, INTERPRETA-
TIONS supra note 10 at 11-16, 236-66; 1 SCHUTZ, PAPERS supra note 3, at 260-86; WITTGEN-
STEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 5. Cf G. EBELING, WORD AND FAITH 305-32 (1963) 
(theological hermeneutics). This emphasis on language is also found in other major traditions of 
modern thought, such as analytic philosophy. See, e.g., J. ,6,.USTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH 
WORDS (2d ed. 1975); J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969), and structuralism, see, e.g., N. CHOM-
SKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957); F. SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1966). 
See generally THE LINGUISTIC TURN (R. Rorty ed. 1967). 
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finite, although not necessarily unchanging.31 Any other claim that 
we might make for the methodology developed in an academic disci-
pline is itself a product of that field's practice, and thus its conceptual 
framework. The one general statement that can be maintained is that 
the conclusions of our academic disciplines, whether they are a truth 
we have discovered or a mythology that we believe, are primarily and 
irreducibly the result of an ongoing practice among a community of 
scholars. 
Because scholarship is a practice that is carried out by a commu-
nity, its statements are best regarded as a mode of discourse.32 Con-
trary to the positivist viewpoint, such statements are not disembodied 
utterances, existing in some neutral space where they can be objec-
tively evaluated. Rather, they are acts of speech, initiated by a partic-
u1ar speaker, or kind of speaker, and directed toward a particular 
audience. They have a particular voice, or approach, which can be 
descriptive, as in natural science, interpretive, as in literary criticism, 
or prescriptive, as in moral philosophy. Whatever voice they use, 
these acts of scholarly speech are intended to persuade their audience. 
They do so by making certain arguments that are recognized as valid 
ones by the community of scholars who are engaged in the practice. 
Such judgments of validity are generally determined by the methodol-
ogy that the practice recognizes, and the role of empirical information 
is determined by that methodology. 
This emphasis on scholarly communities, discourse and explicitly 
selected methodologies does not lead to solipsism, or an idealist con-
tempt for empirical information. 33 Rather it emphasizes the inherent 
31. The term "horizon" is used by Gadamer as an image for a cultural vision that is bounded 
by one's historical position, but can nonetheless change as one moves through history or alters 
one's perspective. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 267-74. The process 
of understanding a previous culture involves expanding one's horizon by joining one's perspec-
tive to theirs. 
32. The term discourse is widely used but, as might be expected, each writer tends to use it 
for his or her own purposes, with consequent divergences in meaning. Here it refers to a special-
ized mode of oral and written communication that is used by an identifiable group of speakers. 
This definition largely follows Ricoeur, The Model of the Text, supra note 10, at 530-37; see also 
RICOEUR, INTERPRETATIONS supra note 10, at 83-88. For related, but not identical usages, see 
FOUCAULT, ARCHEOLOGY supra note 14, at 21-30 (similar to Ricoeur's definition, but Foucault 
maintains discourse can be provisionally isolated from other aspects of culture); HABERMAS, 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 42, 117-18 (rational argument aimed at renewed 
agreement in response to breakdowns in communication); HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra 
note 9, at 203-14 (communication leading to understanding); MARCUSE, supra note 12, at 84-120 
(general mode of social communication). 
33. Much of the hostility that Anglo-American scholars often experience toward continental 
philosophy stems from the belief that it is solipsistic - that it denies the existence of external 
reality. But this is a complete misimpression. In fact, one of the central features of this tradition 
is its recognition of the comprehensive, overwhelming nature of the "world," as we perceive it. 
According to Husserl, all understanding must begin from the "life-world" in which we are totally 
immersed. See HUSSERL, EUROPEAN SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 103-35; E. HUSSERL, IDEAS 
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limitations on our ability to perceive and gather information, and 
counsels an awareness of those limitations. 34 In this sense, the critique 
can be regarded as an effort to improve our understanding of the infor-
mation gathering process, by recognizing that the nature of the infor-
mation we discover depends upon the methodology by which we 
gather it.35 To sanctify empirical information, to claim that it can 
structure our perceptions rather than being structured by them, is sim-
ply a bit of twentieth-century mythology. Moreover, it is a mythology 
that will not only engender undesirable n~rms, 36 but will also distort 
and mislead the process of research itself. 
But our effort to understand our scholarly endeavors requires that 
we do more than recognize the limits of our mental frameworks. We 
must comprehend the way that we construct or select those 
frameworks. This difficult but necessary project requires collective 
self-awareness, the ability of a community of scholars to develop an 
understanding of their own pattern of thought, and to evaluate its op-
101-11 (1931) [hereinafter HUSSERL, IDEAS]. Heidegger's position is even stronger; we are 
"thrown" into the world, by a sort of forcible immersion. BEING AND TIME, supra note 9, at 
219-24; see also id. at 78-148. The problem, in their view, is to struggle out of empirical reality's 
iron embrace, either by a conceptual process (Husserl's reduction) or an existential one (Heideg-
ger's care). Thus, they aspire to a nonempirical transcendence, but they recognize it as a task of 
considerable difficulty precisely because the empirical world is so insistently present for us. The 
problem for scholars would be to free themselves from some of the pregiven structures which 
their own existence within the lifeworld produces through a process of collective self-awareness, 
so that they can achieve a better understanding of their own thought process, or the thought 
process of other people. 
34. With respect to natural science, see, e.g., P. F'EYERABEND, supra note 21; KUHN, SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTIONS supra note 8, at 52-65; N. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1961). 
With respect to social science, see note 9 infra. 
35. This may appear to be an inapposite characterization of Derrida, whose project is relent-. 
lessly critical. But it is clear from his discussion of Saussure, see DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, 
supra note 15, and his response to Searle, see Limited Inc abc .. . , 2 GLYPH 162 (1977), that his 
goal is to discern the nature oflanguage through deconstruction. In fact, deconstruction, with its 
reversal of ordered oppositions such as pure/impure or serious/nonserious, is not very distant 
from Winch's effort to reverse the priority we give to our own culture (which is "present" to us, 
in Derrida's terms). See Winch, supra note 6. Generally speaking, there have not been many 
efforts to apply Derrida's techniques to social science, but see C. NORRIS, THE CONTEST OF 
FACULTIES 19-47 (1985); M. RYAN, MARXISM AND DECONSTRUCTION (1982); Derrida, The 
Conflict of Faculties, in LANGUAGES OF KNOWLEDGE AND INQUIRY (M. Riffaterre ed. 1982). 
Still, Derrida's work is quite new, and has not been fully assimilated by other disciplines outside 
literary criticism. 
36. This is a major area of normative agreement among the writers identified here with the 
critique of methodology. See, e.g., HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 3-5, 67-90; J. 
HABERMAS, Technical Progress and the Social Life-World, in Tow ARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 50 
(1971) [hereinafter HABERMAS, Technical Progress]; HEIDEGGER, Technology, supra note 9; M. 
HORKHEIMER & T. ADORNO, supra note 12, at 31-57; HORKHEIMER, CRmCAL THEORY, supra 
note 12, at 188-243; HORKHEIMER, EcLIPSE, supra note 12, at 61-82, 173-79; HUSSERL, EURO-
PEAN SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 21-68; H. MARCUSE, supra note 12, at 144-99. See also FOU-
CAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 14, at 195-228; M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
(1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY]. Foucault does not draw explicit normative conclu-
sions from his analysis, but it is virtually impossible to read these works without perceiving an 
implicit condemnation. 
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eration. 37 In doing so, the critique advances from being an attack on 
positivism to being a generalized analysis of methodology. Its position 
is that methodologies must be selected on the basis of culturally em-
bedded judgments, and that real knowledge becomes possible only 
when we abandon our idea that a methodology can autonomously gen-
erate the criteria of its own validity. 
The view of scholarship that the critique of methodology suggests, 
therefore, is not despairing, but skeptical and cautious. It asserts that 
we can achieve understanding within our culturally defined horizons, 
but only through a scrupulous process of analysis and self-aware-
ness. 38 It also asserts that we can expand our horizons, but only by 
gradual increments and collective effort. 39 The critique does not rec-
37. It is this aspect of the continental approach that distinguishes it from the consensus truth 
theories of American pragmatism, and from the closely allied reader-response approach to liter-
ary criticism, see, e.g., s. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). Pragmatists are gener-
ally content to accept the social consensus as an adequate definition of truth, but the continental 
thinkers, however persuaded they may be that one cannot transcend one's context (e.g., Derrida, 
Gadamer), regard the effort to conceptualize, control and often change that context as central to 
their enterprise. 
38. The account of this process varies from one writer to another. Indeed, these differences 
are often the defining feature for each of the particular philosophical approaches that contribute 
to the critique of methodology. But virtually all those who have formulated the modem attack 
on positivism propose an alternative that is related to the process of self-awareness, the focused 
analysis on our own frameworks of understanding. See, e.g., I. DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1981) 
(deconstruction); FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 14 (archaeology, that is, analysis of 
underlying discursive structures); GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 305-41 
("the hemeneutically trained mind •.• will make conscious the prejudices governing our own 
understanding .•. ; so long as our mind is influenced by a prejudice, we do not know and 
consider it as a judgment" id. at 266). HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 
366-99 (self-awareness as a path to linguistically established intersubjectivity); HABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13 ("[T]he pursuit of reflection knows itself as a movement of emanci-
pation. Reason is at the same time subject to the interest in reason. We can say that it obeys an 
emancipatory cognitive interest, which aims of the pursuit of reflection." Id. at 128.); 
HORKHEIMER, CRmCAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 209-43 ("Critical thinking ••• is motivated 
today by the effort really to transcend the tension and to abolish the opposition between the 
individual's purposefulness, spontaneity, and rationality, and those work-process relationships on 
which society is built. Critical thought has a concept of man as in conflict with himself until this 
conflict is removed." Id. at 210.); HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 33, at 107-14 (phenomenological 
reduction); cf HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra note 9, at 225-73, 312-48 (care, and the call 
of conscience). It should be noted that self-awareness refers to a process, or an experience of 
human thought, but not necessarily to the subject of that thought. For Husserl, thought, or the 
mind, is also the primary object of that process, but for Heidegger and Gadamer, it is the world. 
Habermas attempts to combine the two approaches in HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 
supra note 13. 
39. This is particularly true in the human sciences, where the object of research is itself a 
discourse. To achieve the understanding of human action which we seek, we must understand 
that it constitutes a meaningful construction of reality by the actors, and that we can approach it 
only through the medium of our own construction of reality. See GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 28; A. LoucH, supra note 7; 1 SCHUTZ, PAPERS, supra note 3, at 3-66; C. TAYLOR, 
supra note 28; P. WINCH, supra note 6, at 72-109; M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phenomenology and the 
Sciences of Man, in THE PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION 43 (J. Edie ed. 1964) (interpretation of Hus-
serl). The process is generally called "empathetic understanding," a translation of the German 
word verstehen. See also HEGEL, supra note 23, at 180-213. 
"Verstehen," in both its original and translated forms, has been a source of some confusion, 
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ommend that the existing methodologies of scholarship be abandoned 
or transcended. Given the fact that these methodologies are generated 
by the ongoing tradition of the scholarship itself, and by the broader 
cultural context in which that scholarship exists, such transcendence is 
not possible. To recommend it, moreover, would require either an al-
ternative methodology, which contradicts the essence of the critique, 
or a chimerical rejection of our organized bodies of knowledge. In-
stead, what the critique suggests is that we become conscious of the 
assumptions built into our various methodologies, recognize their limi-
tations, develop an ability to move from one of those available meth-
odologies to another, and engage in a process that can gradually 
transform those methodologies in directions suggested by our underly-
ing norms. 40 
since it is used in at least two different ways. It is clear to virtually everyone that some fairly 
sophisticated mental effort is involved in attempting to understand a different culture, or a sepa-
rate subgroup within one's own culture. Those who assert the objective nature of social science 
treat this mental effort as a form of empathy, a cognitive technique that must be employed when 
dealing with people as opposed to protons. See, e.g., Abel, The Operation Called Verstehen 54 
AM. J. Soc. 211 (1948); Parsons, supra note 28. The countervailing position, which is the one 
that belongs to the critique of methodology, is that the term refers to the mental effort involved 
in recognizing one's own system of understanding, and approaching the behavior of others 
through that recognition. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 11, at 235-74; 
HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 107-41; 1 SCHUTZ, PAPERS, supra note 
3, at 48-66; McCarthy, On Misunderstanding "Understanding': 3 THEORY & DECISION 351 
(1973). Since the position being described here is that of the critique, the term "empathetic 
understanding" is intended in the latter sense of verstehen. 
40. This project is perhaps the most important feature that distinguishes the critique of meth-
odology from structuralism. Structuralism's basic claim is that individuality, and the individual 
consciousness, is not a preempirical prerequisite to knowledge of the world, as hermeneutics and 
phenomenology assert, but a product of forces that exist within the world. See, e.g., C. LEVI-
STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 245-69 (1966); C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED 
(1970); J. PIAGET, STRUCTURALISM (1970); F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 30. Understanding, 
according to the structuralists, lies in perceiving these forces, not in a process of self-revelation. 
Despite these differences, structuralism is related to the critique of methodology in the shared 
belief that knowledge, more specifically scholarship, is a product of culture. Thus, both ap-
proaches locate a society's claims to objectivity within the discourse of that society. Both recog-
nize the social construction of the self, although certain elements of the critique allow for a 
transcendent self. See, e.g., HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra note 9, at 225-348; HUSSERL, 
EUROPEAN SCIENCES supra note 2, at 184-89. Structuralism, however, must ultimately rely on 
some form of positivism; since social and cultural forces create the human mind, they must exist 
independent of it, although at a deeper level than the reality perceived by the members of the 
society itself. This, of course, leads to one of structuralism's major weak points: what is it that 
perceives these forces, and how is that perception achieved? 
Foucault guardedly identifies himself as a structuralist at certain points, see, e.g., FOUCAULT, 
ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 14, at 15, but his work seems more correctly based midway between 
structuralism and the critique of methodology. Cf. H. DREYFUS & P. RABINOW, MICHEL Fou-
CAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS (1982) (identifying Foucault's tech-
niques of archaeology and geneology as "interpretive analytics," a combination of structuralist 
and hermeneutic approaches). Foucault's attack on positivism has the pointed quality of the 
critique, see, e.g., FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 14, at 21-76; FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, 
supra note 14, at 216-28; FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 344-87 (1973). In addition, he 
attempts to develop methods for achieving self-awareness of the forces he perceives, see Fou-
CAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 14, at 24-30; M. FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/ 
KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRmNGS 1972-1977, at 172-77 (1980) 
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This description of the critique of methodology is not intended as a 
claim that the critique is the only proper view of scholarship, or that 
its attack on positivism and objectivism is irrefutable. Its application 
to natural science, in fact, seems somewhat implausible in the face of 
technology. The point, rather, is to present the critique, and then to 
explore its implications for legal scholarship. The critique itself sug-
gests that its value can only be determined through such an explora-
tion. What seems unarguable, however, is that the effort should be 
made. When a broad philosophic movement specifically devotes much 
of its energies to the analysis of scholarship, and generates such a com-
prehensive vision as the critique of methodology, its possibilities for 
any field should not be ignored. 
There is, moreover, one major point of contact between the cri-
tique of methodology and more familiar, or traditional views of schol-
arly endeavor. Both approaches recognize scholarship as a subject, a 
distinguishable enterprise that merits separate intellectual attention. 
The primary feature that distinguishes this enterprise as a discourse 
used by a group of culturally identified practitioners is that it relies on 
structured argument. Scholars are not supposed to prevail by exercis-
ing power, and while this technique is not unknown in academic cir-
cles, it is generally regarded as a distortion of the discourse, rather 
than an aspect of it. Similarly, scholars are not supposed to use strate-
gic arguments designed to persuade by their emotional effect on the 
listener. Instead they are expected to frame arguments that can be 
evaluated through the use of other arguments, or alternatively, by 
means of a cognitive faculty that we identify as reason.41 This view of 
reason may itself be culturally dependent, but it is universal in our 
culture, and it distinguishes our view of scholarship from many other 
social practices. 
A frequently expressed idea is that scholarship operates as part of 
the existing power structure, and contributes to its continuation or ex-
tension; within the tradition that has produced the critique of meth-
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, Truth and Power], although he generally refuses to assert that self-
awareness will lead to any desirable results. For a lapse, see FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, supra note 
29, at 205-33 (revolutionary vision based on conjunction of self-awareness and action). 
41. This typology is derived from Habermas, who distinguishes between strategic and com-
municative action. The former is an argument that is designed to influence a rational opponent, 
and is thus oriented toward success. (Another category of success-oriented actions are what he 
calls instrumental ones, which intervene in circumstances and events.) Communicative action, in 
contrast, is oriented toward reaching understanding. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 
supra note 13, at 284-95. Although Habermas' notion of "understanding" is complex, it in· 
cludes, at least in part, the idea of persuasion through reasoned argument. The use of the term in 
this Article is not meant to imply any sense of objective validity; it refers to the kind of appeal 
that the speaker makes. 
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odology, the most forceful proponent of this position is Foucault.42 
But that is not inconsistent with the view that scholarship is a separate 
enterprise, whose discourse is based on reasoned argument. The mere 
fact that there exists a dominant power structure does not preclude a 
division of labor within that structure. Presumably, the President, the 
members of Congress, and the chief executive officers of the Fortune 
500 companies are all members of the American power structure, but 
they obviously fill different roles within it. Scholars also constitute a 
distinguishable role, and this remains true whether or not they are part 
of the power structure.43 What distinguishes them is that their explicit 
discourse consists of reasoned argument, not the exercise of political 
authority or the control of natural resources. In fact, it is this reliance 
upon reason that makes the assertion that scholars support the power 
structure both controversial and provocative. To assert that the Presi-
dent is part of the power structure would not be very interesting; the 
assertion is interesting with respect to scholars precisely because their 
role and discourse is explicitly grounded upon reason as opposed to 
power.44 
B. Legal Scholarship as Prescriptive and Normative Discourse 
When viewed as an academic discourse, the most distinctive fea-
ture of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive voice, its con-
sciously declared desire to improve the performance of legal decision-
makers. As Paul Brest, George Fletcher and Mark Tushnet, 45 among 
42. Specifically, he treats the human sciences as elements of the "bio-power" that modem 
society exercises over its members. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE supra note 14; FOUCAULT, SEX-
UALITY, supra note 34; FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, supra note 40. 
43. Of course, scholars sometimes serve as advisors to public officials, or become public offi-
cials themselves, but we generally have little difficulty distinguishing these roles. For example, 
we would not describe a memorandum by a law professor, advising the State Department on a 
point of international law, as scholarship. 
44. For an application of Foucault's approach to legal interpretation, which recognizes the 
same distinction, see Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (With Suggestions 
on How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850 (1985). There is an ambiguity in the use 
of the word "power," which can mean direct control over others through social institutions, a 
control which scholars generally do not possess, or the more general ability to influence events, 
which they sometimes do possess. It will be used here in the former sense, but there is no avoid-
ing the ambiguity. ("Authority" is even worse, because it has a purely intellectual component. 
We do not describe Williston as a power, but we do say that he is an authority.) 
45. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-89 (1981); Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal 
Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 995 (1981); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 
YALE L.J. 1205, 1208-15 (1981). These articles are all part of a symposium, Legal Scholarship: 
Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955-1296 (1981), that represents one of the most extensive 
and significant discussions of legal scholarship in recent years. A somewhat similar point is 
advanced in Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 775-78 (1986); 
Munger & Seron, Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal Theory: A Comment on Method, 6 
LAW & POLY. 257, 260-61 (1984); 
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others, have suggested, the point of an article about a judicial decision 
is usually to remonstrate with the judge for the conclusion reached 
and for the rationale adopted. The point of an article about a statu-
tory provision or a regulation is to expose the errors made in drafting 
it, and to indicate what should have been done instead. Occasionally, 
an article will actually speak about a legal decision with total approba-
tion, but that does not alter its prescriptive quality. The point is then 
to recommend the same course of action to other decision-makers, or 
to encourage the original decision-maker to keep up the good work. 
This prescriptive voice distinguishes legal scholarship from most other 
academic fields. The natural sciences and the social sciences charac-
teristically adopt a descriptive stance,46 while literary critics adopt an 
interpretive one.47 Only moral philosophers seem to share the legal 
scholar's penchant for explicit prescription. 
Since standard legal scholarship is intimately involved with legal 
doctrine, and generally couches its prescriptions in doctrinal terms, it 
includes many descriptive or interpretive statements about doctrine. 
But the descriptive material is often prolegomenous; scholars must de-
scribe an opinion so that their readers will know what they are attack-
ing. Legal history and legal anthropology are exceptions, being 
predominantly descriptive, but their compound names reveal their un-
certain status; whatever their value, these subjects do not fall within 
the boundaries of standard legal scholarship.48 The same is generally 
46. In other words, the basic discourse of these fields is that they are describing a knowable 
reality. That is not to say that positivism is a universal stance of natural and social scientists. 
Modem particle physicists find themselves confronting experimental results which they often 
explain by interactions between the observation mechanism and the object. See N. BOHR, 
ATOMIC PHYSICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (1958); P. DAVIES, THE FORCES OF NATURE 
(1979); W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND (1971); J. POLKINGHORNE, THE PARTICLE 
PLAY: AN ACCOUNT OF THE ULTIMATE CONSTITUENTS OF MATTER (1979). Similarly, social 
scientists have begun to use insights from the critique of methodology in the investigation of 
social phenomena. See, e.g., G. BATESON, NAVEN (1958); A. C!COUREL, METHOD AND MEA-
SUREMENT IN SOCIOLOGY (1964); J. FAVRET-SAADA, DEADLY WORDS: WITCHCRAFT IN THE 
BOCAGE (C. Cullen trans. 1980); H. GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967); 
GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION. supra note 28. Nonetheless, the dominant discourse of natural and 
social science remains essentially descriptive. 
47. Habermas divides cognitive interests into the technical (descriptive), the practical (inter-
pretive, or hermeneutic) and the emancipatory (normative). See HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, 
supra note 13, at 301-17. See also note 49 infra. Here, however, the terms are not used to 
represent a definitive taxonomy of human thought, but only the types of claims which various 
scholarly communities advance about their own statements. For this reason, any one of these 
claims can underlie any of the others; these are not absolute categories, but only modes of dis-
course. In HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 273-337, Habermas gives a 
somewhat different taxonomy, see note 40 supra, and places it on a more discursive, less definitive 
basis, but he continues to assert that his categories have a significance beyond their use in dis-
course. 
For a discussion of the types of claims that underlie the prescriptions of legal scholarship, see 
text at notes 52-56 infra. 
48. An important exception is a series of descriptive studies of our corporate and business-
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true for so-called trade literature, which is equally descriptive. The 
summary of last year's cases on Topic A, or the list of regulations 
issued under Statute B, are viewed as appropriate material for practi-
tioner journals, or continuing legal education, but legal academics gen-
erally do not regard them as scholarship. Like legal history and legal 
anthropology, they are viewed as a separate discourse by both their 
own authors and by the participants in the practice of legal 
scholarship. 
Similarly, the interpretation of doctrine generally serves as a basis 
for prescription, rather than an independent goal of scholarship. 
There is relatively little academic writing that simply explicates the 
meaning of a judicial decision. More typically, the interpretation of 
meaning is used to criticize a decision that relies upon a differing inter-
pretation. This can be a powerful criticism in a legal culture where 
texts serve as the basis of judicial authority. But the general stance of 
legal scholarship, as opposed to practitioner literature, is to prescribe 
an alternative decision to the judge, not to explore the meaning of a 
legal text as a final, inherently valid expression of the law.49 
related laws by Robert Clark. See, e.g., Abstract Rights versus Paper Rights Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445 (1975); The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections 
on Investment Management Treatises (Book Review), 94 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1981); The Mor-
phogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 
(1977). Clark assesses his methodology, and calls for its more general use, in an article in the 
Yale Symposium, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution 90 YALE L.J. 1238 (1981). The 
absence of any response to his call suggests how committed legal scholars are to prescriptive 
discourse. In addition, Clark's approach, once stated in explicit terms with claims to "scientific" 
validity - he actually uses the word, id. at 1238 - creates some formidable difficulties, as the 
critique of methodology suggests. 
To begin with, his central concept, evolution, is a cultural construct even in natural science; it 
is, in effect, a metaphor that depends on preempirical understandings about change and causality. 
Applied to social science or legal history, it is a second-order metaphor. Legal doctrines are not 
recognizable physical entities, like the plants and animals in the natural science version, nor is 
there any clear relationship between Clark's notion of economic causation and the causal mecha-
nism of physical evolution. Use of the metaphor thus depends upon further nonempirical as-
sumptions that call its scientific quality into question. 
Moreover, the evolution Clark describes is an evolution of cultural conceptions; Winch would 
argue that one must participate in these conceptions in order to describe them. While this may 
be disputed, the fact is that Clark, as a law-trained scholar, does participate in them; he under-
stands them from the inside, as it were, which renders his discussion of them rather different 
from a biologist's discussion of the evolution of the barnacle. 
Finally, we inevitably perceive Clark's statements about corporate law as inherently norma-
tive, whether Clark thinks they are or not. For this reason, it is conceivable for another legal 
scholar, Duncan Kennedy, to respond to Clark's call for scientific objectivity by stating that 
"there ought to be more women and more blacks on the Yale faculty." Cost-Reduction Theory as 
Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275, 1283 (1981). 
49. The distinction among prescriptive, descriptive and interpretive legal discourse, while 
derived from Habermas, see note 47 supra, is closely related to Max Weber's taxonomy in the 
Sociology of Law. This essay, which appears as part 2, chapter 7 of2 M. WEBER, EcoNOMY AND 
SOCIETY 641 (G. Roth & c. Wittich eds. 1978), is the subject of a recent study, A. KRONMAN, 
MAX WEBER (1983). Weber divides the study oflaw into moral evaluation, sociological analysis 
and legal dogmatics, the last being what we would call doctrinal interpretation. The term 
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In addition to a prevailing voice, or approach, a scholarly dis-
course is also characterized by the identity of its speakers, the identity 
of its audience and its criteria for determining the validity of the 
speakers' statements. There is no particular difficulty identifying the 
speakers, or originators of legal scholarship, but the field's reliance on 
a prescriptive approach raises some complex issues in identifying its 
audience and the nature of its validity claims. At one level, the audi-
ence for legal scholarship might be seen as consisting primarily of 
other scholars. It is certainly the writer's intention to persuade those 
scholars, and academic reputations often depend on the success of the 
effort. But this is an observation about the nature of individual moti-
vation, not about the nature of the discourse. Other scholars have no 
abstract interest in being persuaded; the determinative factor is not the 
intended audience of a particular scholar, but the mutual, or "inter-
subjective"50 audience of the discourse as a whole. A discourse that 
views other scholars as its primary audience is necessarily one that is 
making descriptive claims, or has a consensus theory of truth, with 
those scholars comprising the relevant community that defines consen-
sus. This is not the case with legal scholarship. Being prescriptive, its 
mutually recognized audience is the group of public decision-makers 
to whom the prescriptions are addressed. Standard legal scholarship 
is typically directed toward a judge, and occasionally to a legislator, 
administrator, or equivalent public decision-maker. The declared in-
tention of the work, the perspective which controls its language, is to 
persuade one of these decision-makers to adopt its prescriptions. 
Given this choice of audience, the validity of the prescriptions in a 
work of legal scholarship can be measured in one of two ways. First, 
the work might be regarded as valid if it actually did persuade the 
"moral" is Kronrnan's; Weber uses "political," but as Kronman points out, this is misleading, 
because Weber's category refers to any evaluation oflaw on a nonlegal basis. Id. at 8-10. Legal 
dogmatics includes pure descriptions of legal concepts, as wen as critical assessments from an 
internal perspective, while sociology consists of pure, and perhaps value-free description from an 
external perspective. Id. at 10-14. 
There is an awkwardness to Weber's terminology in modern usage; for example, Professor 
Kronman notes that a legal practitioner's article describing a recent line of cases would ran under 
the rubric of legal sociology. Id. at 9-10. But the main differences between Weber's taxonomy 
and the one presented here is that prescription, being discursively defined as any recommenda-
tion to a legal decision-maker, is a broader category than moral evaluation. 
50. This term is most closely associated with mutual, or shared experience. Husserl uses it 
because he begins from a position of absolute subjectivity. He then constructs the experience of 
perceiving others, and relating to them through one's own subjective experience. When a group 
of people go through this process in relation to each other, the result is intersubjectivity. Hus-
SERL, MEDITATIONS supra note 27, at 89-151. Although the term is awkward, it is widely used, 
see, e.g., HABERMAS, CoMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 386-99; 1 SCHUTZ, PAPERS 
supra note 3, at 10-15; Taylor, supra note 28, because it carries a recognition of the subjective 
starting point that is lacking in terms like "shared" or "mutual." 
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decision-maker, perhaps with the qualification that no calamitous re-
sult followed too quickly upon the decision-maker's action. More 
often, however, its validity will depend on whether other scholars gen-
erally agree that the decision-maker should be so persuaded. The fact 
that other scholars serve as a measure of success does not change the 
nature of the audience. The mutually recognized, or intersubjective 
audience is the decision-maker, and the work's success depends on 
what the group of scholars think the decision-maker should do. In a 
descriptive field, like natural science, the audience is the group of 
scholars themselves, and determinations of validity are based on their 
own evaluations, without reference to the views of reactions by a sepa-
rate group of people. 51 Of course, all research requires funding in our 
complicated era, so the scientist must appeal to the judgment of 
whomever society or commerce has endowed with economic re-
sources. But the issue remains essentially the same. If the funders 
evaluate a research project by standards internal to the discipline, we 
would say that they are acting like scientists. If they rely on the views 
of those outside the scholarly community, we would describe their de-
cisions as political, or religious, or otherwise unscientific. But legal 
scholarship does not become nonlegal because it is addressed to 
judges, legislators, or administrators. Its basic nature is to structure 
its statements as recommendations to decision-makers of that kind. 
Prescriptions of the sort that characterize legal scholarship can be 
based on norms, instrumentalism, or authority; one can prescribe a 
course of action because it is morally desirable, because it will achieve 
a particular result, or because it is commanded by some established 
source of power. Legal prescriptions make use of all three types of 
claims. Of these, however, the normative basis is by far the most im-
portant one at present. The prescriptions of contemporary legal schol-
arship are predominantly based on policy arguments - beliefs about 
the way society should be organized or operated. When legal scholars 
address judges with calls for fairness, or freedom, or economic effi-
ciency, or protection of the environment, they are basing their pre-
scriptions largely on normative considerations. When they address 
legislators, a considerably rarer occurrence, 52 their arguments are even 
more likely to be normative ones. 
Instrumental arguments can also serve as the basis for legal pre-
51. See P. FEYERABEND, supra note 21; KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS supra note 8, at 
77-109; C. PIERCE, supra note 16; Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Re-
search Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91 (I. Lakatos & A. 
Musgrave eds. 1970). 
52. See text at notes 129-46 infra (discussing aspects oflegal scholarship that orient it toward 
addressing judges, not legislators). 
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scriptions. Scholars sometimes argue a judge should reach a given de-
cision because certain consequences will fl.ow from that decision, or 
that the legislature should enact a given statute because it will produce 
particular results. But normative arguments almost always underlie 
the instrumental ones; the legal scholar needs to persuade the judge or 
legislature that those consequences and results are desirable. Of 
course, all instrumental arguments ultimately rest on normative 
choices, but the crucial question for a scholarly field is how controver-
sial these choices are, how far below the surface of the discourse they 
reside. Medical scholarship is often prescriptive ("to stop seizures, 
prescribe phenobarbital") but it rests on a descriptive theory of the 
human body. The normative basis of the prescription, that good 
health is a good thing, is well accepted and provokes controversy only 
in limited areas, like mental illness. 53 For legal prescriptions, the nor-
mative basis of instrumental arguments is much more controversial, 
and this controversy tends to draw those arguments into the norma-
tive arena. 
Authority-based arguments exhibit a similar drift toward norma-
tivity. These arguments are generally addressed to judges, who are 
supposed to interpret legally binding texts, rather than to legislators, 
who derive their power from the electorate, and are largely free of 
textual constraints. Even when the audience is a judge, however, pre-
scriptions cannot be based exclusively on precedents or statutes, to say 
nothing of the Constitution. Precedents are reinterpreted or over-
ruled, statutes must evolve, and the Constitution is almost limitlessly 
protean. The choice of interpretive styfo, and the relative importance 
to be given to the text in general, is an essentially normative issue. 
Again, the question is how far below the surface of the discourse these 
normative issues lie. In some societies, they were too deeply immersed 
to be within the scholar's conscious grasp,54 but in our society they are 
ever-present. Judges might attempt to obscure them in the interest of 
political legitimacy, but the scholar's commitment to rational dis-
53. See, e.g., T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (rev. ed. 1974); Daniels, The Social 
Construction of Military Psychiatric Diagnosis, 2 RECENT Soc. 118 (1970). Again, this general 
normative agreement does not prove the objective validity of the good health norm, or even of 
the concept of health itself. See M. FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (1975). It is simply 
a dominant discourse, with a mutually or intersubjectively understood terminology. 
54. At many periods of Western European history, for example, moral philosophy was based 
on the interpretation of the Bible, and the normative question about whether the Bible should be 
used as the basis of morality was not within the conscious horizon of those who participated in 
the discourse. This does not mean that normative considerations did not enter into the interpre-
tive process (or, to put the matter more precisely, modern scholars would generally claim that 
normative considerations did in fact enter). But the discourse of the medieval scholars was per-
ceived by those scholars themselves as interpretive (or, more precisely, we would describe their 
perception of what they themselves were doing as interpretive). 
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course forbids this strategy. Consequently, the major import of pre-
scriptions that are explicitly based upon authority is often their 
normative argument about the status of the source. 
The reason for this irreducible normativity is that the subject of 
legal scholarship is law, and law is a mechanism through which our 
society operationalizes its normative choices. In a society like ours, 
moreover, these choices are a matter of conscious and continual de-
bate. Any discussion of our legal system necessarily joins that debate, 
even if its arguments are mediated by instrumental or authority-based 
assertions. It may be possible, at least in theory, to escape by writing 
legal anthropology or legal history. But when analysis focuses on our 
own society, the discussion will be almost inevitably normative. 
The normative quality of legal scholarship is not equivalent to the 
frequently observed and much-debated connection between law and 
politics, although there is an undeniable relationship. Politics, as the 
term is used in ordinary language, is the active practice of statecraft, 
and necessarily involves the exercise of power, or the aspiration to do 
so. A strong case can be made for treating judges as political figures, 
according to this characterization, 55 but the same cannot be said of 
legal scholars. Our conception of the scholarly enterprise precludes 
direct exercises of power, and regards reasoned argument as its defin-
ing feature. What can be said is that there is a close connection be-
tween the underlying normative systems of modern politics and 
modern legal scholarship; their visions of the state, of human life, and 
of such crucial concepts as freedom, equality, fairness, and well-being 
are notably related. But this does not make politics and legal scholar-
ship a single mode of social discourse. They are separate modes, built 
on closely related normative foundations. 56 
55. This is, of course, a central tenet of the critical legal studies movement. See, e.g., M. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977); R. UNGER, THE 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 
30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Ori-
gins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). 
56. It might be said that the scholarly study of an essentially political field, like law, makes 
legal scholarship equivalent to political science. That is not the case, however; the discourses are 
inherently different. Political science generally adopts a consciously descriptive stance. As a 
result, it not only studies the legal decision-makers that legal scholars address, but also devotes 
much attention to other political actors, such as voters or lobbyists, who cannot be usefully 
addressed in prescriptive terms. Voting behavior, for example, one of the major areas of scholar-
ship in political science, is almost totally absent from legal literature. Thus, legal scholarship is a 
separate discourse from both politics and political science, although it displays substantial con-
nections with each of them. 
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C. The Recognition of Normativity and the Inapplicability of the 
Critique 
Speaking very roughly, therefore, the critique of methodology sug-
gests that legal scholarship, like all scholarship, is a mode of discourse, 
but that it differs from most other disciplines because of its inherently 
normative aspect. The critique is much more than a convenient means 
of describing or characterizing academic disciplines, however. It rep-
resents a basic challenge to our prevailing conception of these disci-
plines and to the validity of their assertions. The idea that social 
science and history are culturally based projections, rather than accu-
rate descriptions of reality, is a disconcerting one; the idea that the 
same is true of natural science may seem either disorienting or absurd, 
depending on one's point of view. Of course, the actual impact of the 
critique is more limited than its philosophic implications. In general, 
it has affected scholarship only when the ongoing discourse of that 
scholarship produced problems of validity that were independently 
recognized within the discourse. 57 But the challenge that the critique 
of methodology poses to our prevailing notions about objective truth 
and the enterprise of academic scholarship runs much deeper than its 
observable effects. 
This challenge, however, does not apply to the central claims of 
standard legal scholarship. Because their discourse is a normative 
one, legal scholars are not attempting to describe an allegedly objective 
reality, and most of them are not even attempting to discover real 
meanings embedded in authoritative texts. Their purpose is to address 
prescriptions to public decision-makers. They are reasonably clear 
that they are addressing a specific audience, and advancing culturally 
contingent arguments as methods of persuasion. In other words, legal 
scholarship already concedes the primacy of the normative realm, and 
thus regards itself as a practice, not a disembodied declaration of ob-
jective truths. However disconcerting the critique of methodology 
may seem when applied to natural or social science, it represents our 
ordinary understanding of contemporary legal scholarship. 
Not every work of legal scholarship, to be sure, exhibits the same 
level of sophistication. Very often, scholars speak of law as if it has 
some fixed existence, or treat texts as repositories of unambiguous 
meanings that quietly await discovery inside their web of words. But 
the question is how these scholars explain their enterprise when called 
upon to do so, not how they express themselves on all occasions. Be-
57. For a general account of this process with respect to social science, see R. BERNSTEIN, 
supra note 22. With respect to particle physics, see note 46 supra. 
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cause they are operating within an ongoing discourse, many scholars 
tend to lapse into a conceptual shorthand, reifying law or texts in ways 
that they would not defend. In addition, there are undoubtedly a 
number of scholars who are not particularly sophisticated about the 
nature of their own activities. But a serious critique must aim at the 
most advanced, well-reasoned portions of its subject matter, rather 
than trying to pick off waifs and stragglers. 
There was once a time when legal scholars did lay claim to objec-
tivity. They believed they were engaged in the process of discovering 
true legal principles that stood above and beyond the ordinary sphere 
oflaw, or that they were tracing the implications of principles that had 
been discovered.58 This doctrine is now known as "formalism." In 
part, it was an ideal that was never quite achieved; in part it was a 
generalization that captured one aspect of the prevailing scholarship; 
and in part, it was a post hoc characterization by its opponents, as 
might be expected of anything so named. In any case, it is now essen-
tially defunct; current scholarship, at least in its more sophisticated 
and self-conscious form, maintains that social choices determine our 
legal system, and that the very grandest forces that inform these 
choices are cultural norms, not general and enduring principles of Law 
itself. 
Ironically, the asserted objectivity of formalism was deqisively re-
futed by a form of positivism, the very same intellectual movement 
that championed the objectivity of other academic disciplines. The 
legal realist movement, which flourished during the 1920s and 1930s 
and ended the formalist era, was essentially a positivist approach to 
law. This was true in two senses. Within the scope of legal discourse, 
legal realism was positivist because it rejected the transcendental prin-
ciples of formalism, and insisted that all law was created by some iden-
tifiable human agent.59 In more general terms, it was positivist 
because it claimed that the existing legal rules were a fixed reality that 
58. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 35-44 (1974) (discussing Williston); R. 
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, 56-
60 (1983); Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728-31 (1976); White, The Impact 
of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1978). For classic examples 
of the formalist approach, see J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1935); c. 
LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880); S. WILLISTON, THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS, (1st ed. 1931). 
59. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); R. POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING 
TO LAW 32-61 (1951); Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1912); Cohen, Property 
and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 22 (1927); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 457 (1897). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) ("The common 
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign ... that 
can be identified .•.. ") 
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could be discovered by empirical methods. 60 Such empiricism could 
not be sustained, because of the inherent normativity of law. Legal 
scholars, who saw themselves as participants in the effort to improve 
the law, or improve society through the use of law were not satisfied to 
treat law as a fixture of a folkway. Consequently the whole approach 
unravelled fairly rapidly, 61 although not without leaving an imprint 
upon legal scholarship strongly affecting social science analysis of the 
law and most significantly for present purposes, destroying formalism. 
Thus, the positivist mood of the 1920s and 1930s, which celebrated 
the objective claims of other disciplines, proved fatal to the asserted 
objectivity of legal scholarship. This apparent contradiction between 
positivism's effect on legal scholarship and its effect on scholarship in 
other disciplines is readily explained. Objectivity in legal scholarship 
was not an empirical concept, but a transcendental one. And this fol-
lows in turn from the scholarship's normative character; any claim to 
objectivity that it advances must assert the existence of universally 
valid ethical statements, rather than objectively accurate descriptions. 
It was formalism's assertion of objective norms that legal realism suc-
cessfully destroyed. By the time the critique of methodology took aim 
at the asserted objectivity of academic disciplines, therefore, there was 
one discipline - law - whose claim to objectivity was already a smol-
dering ruin. In short, the critique of methodology's attack on positiv-
ism would have been devastating for the legal scholarship of eighty 
years ago, but it does not have much impact at the present time. 62 
The effect of the realist movement on legal scholarship can be re-
stated in terms of the connection between law and politics. Legal real-
ism did not introduce normatively-based discourse into legal 
60. See, e.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 809 (1935); Moore & Sussman, The Current Account and Set-Offs Between an Insolvent 
Bank and Its Customer, 41 YALE L.J. 1109 (1932); Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drawing 
Against Uncollected Checks (pts. 1 & 2), 45 YALE L.J. 1, 260 (1935); Pound, The Call for a 
Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). On the empirical orientation of the legal 
realist movement, see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-94 (1973); Schle-
gel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUF-
FALO L. REv. 459 (1979) [hereinafter Schlegel, American Legal Realism]; Schlegel, American 
Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUF-
FALO L. REv. 195 (1980) [hereinafter Schlegel, Underhill Moore]. 
61. See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1159-90 (1985); 
Schlegel, Underhill Moore, supra note 60. 
62. In fact, leading figures in the critique of methodology do not even seem to be aware that 
such a thing as prescriptive legal scholarship exists. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 
supra note 11, at 289-305 (discussing "legal hermeneutics" in terms of judges and legal histori-
ans); HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 243-71 (discussion of the conflict 
of values in legal decision-making and jurisprudence). At one point, Habermas does state that 
the discipline of jurisprudence can "be transposed into professional practices, for example ... 
into the administration of justice or legal journalism." Id. at 253. Precisely what he means by 
legal journalism is not explained. 
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scholarship, since formalism displayed a highly, if not exclusively nor-
mative perspective. 63 But realism brought the normative grounding of 
the scholarship into more direct contact with the normative grounding 
of political action. The norms of formalism, which centered around 
questions of individual obligations and commercial rights, were gener-
ally conceived as transcendental and objective, rather than being re-
lated to the political issues of the day. But modem legal scholarship is 
centrally concerned with the same questions of social organization, 
wealth distribution and personal rights that loom large in the political 
arena. The change that realism brought about, therefore, is not an 
identity of law and politics, but a coordination of their underlying nor-
mative concerns. That was enough, however, to discredit formalism's 
transcendental norms, and thus eliminate the scholarly claims that 
would be vulnerable to the critique of methodology. 
Not only is the critique inapplica{?le to the normative claims of 
current legal scholarship, but it does not even have much impact on its 
descriptive or interpretive elements. Most scholarly descriptions of 
the law, after all, no longer claim to be describing either nature, natu-
ral law, or enduring transcendental principles. They are describing 
statements made within a larger practice, and in a discourse for which 
the scholars, by virtue of their training, are "native speakers." To put 
the matter more precisely, most thoughtful legal scholars recognize 
that their work is a discourse about a related discourse, not about a set 
of external, or nondiscursive phenomena. While descriptive problems 
certainly arise, even in this context, they pose fewer theoretical issues. 
The critique of methodology is committed to the idea that members of 
society can understand each other's statements, and that members of a 
subgroup who share a particular discourse can understand the state-
ments made within that discourse. 64 
The critique of methodology also applies to the interpretation of 
legal texts with less force than it applies to interpretation generally. 
Its general assertion is that meanings are not embedded inside texts, 
63. For a discussion of the relative position of the normative perspective in formalist and 
post-formalist discourse, see text at note 81 infra. 
64. See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 11, at 345-97; GEERTZ, INTER-
PRETATION supra note 28, at 87-141; HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 
8-101; HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra note 9, at 149-68; KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 23-51; A. LOUCH, supra note 7, at 159-232; l SCHUTZ, PAPERS, supra 
note 3, at 7-27; P. WINCH, supra note 6, at 57-65; L. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra 
note 5, §§ 1-64, 138-242, at 2-31, 53-88. Wittgenstein's argument against the existence of a pri-
vate language is a variation of this point. Id. §§ 199-298. Nor is Husserl an exception; although 
there is a predominant emphasis on subjective experience in his work, he emphasizes the inter-
subjective nature of social experience (the "communalization" of the lifeworld). See HUSSERL, 
EUROPEAN SCIENCES, supra note 2, at 161-72. 
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like pearls in oysters; rather they are generated by the interaction of 
the text and the interpreters, and must be continually reconstructed as 
the interpreters move though history. But this is precisely the way 
most legal scholars view interpretation these days. Their general view 
is that texts are sources of authority for legal decision-makers, but not 
sources of inherent meaning. The meaning of the text is to be con-
structed by active interpretation, and continuously renewed as social 
conditions evolve. 65 
There are of course some scholars, particularly constitutional 
scholars, who adopt "originalism" - the belief that the proper under-
standing of the relevant text can be reached by looking at its literal 
language, in the light of its author's actual intentions. 66 And schools 
of thought associated with the critique of methodology, specifically 
hermeneutics, have been invoked as an answer to this claim. 67 But 
since the originalist position exists within a normative discourse, 
rather than standing nakedly by itself as an interpretive assertion, it 
can be readily reconstituted in the face of hermeneutic criticism. All 
that sophisticated originalists need to say is that they are adopting 
their stance in order to achieve some normative goal, like securing 
majority rule, or preventing judicial tyranny. 68 Having done so, the 
underlying basis of their assertions is no longer a direct argument 
about the text; if they can agree what strict construction means -
which they can, sometimes - the critique of methodology would re-
65. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); Fiss, • 
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982). Professor Eskridge's view of statu· 
tory interpretation is derived from the "legal hermeneutics" of Gadamer, Eskridge, supra at 
1506-11. While he argues that the recognition of this approach, as an explicit theory of interpre-
tation, would improve the process, he also argues that it is already implicit in the modem view of 
law. Id. at 1497-538. 
66. See, e.g .. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Demo-
cratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Kmiec & McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return 
to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525 (1987). The term "interpretiv-
ism" is often used for the same approach, see, e.g .. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure 
and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975), but it will be avoided here, because "interpretation" is widely used for 
obviously different purposes in the law and literature movement, see, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LA w's 
EMPIRE 45-68 (1986); Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common 
Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979), and in hermeneutic theory, see, 
e.g., GADAMER, supra note 11, at 345-97. 
67. In this case, however, the argument is being invoked within the discourse as a critique of 
one particular position, rather than as a critique of the discourse as a whole. See, e.g., Grey, The 
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Levinson, Low as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. 
REV. 373 (1982); Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 939 (1986). 
68. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 66, at 18-24; Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 66, at 527·29; 
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). 
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gard their approach as perfectly coherent. The response to this recon-
stituted originalism, and probably the dominant position among legal 
scholars, is that it fails to take account of changing circumstances, fails 
to reflect our moral framework, fails to give judges an adequate role, 
and so forth. 69 That may be true, but it is a normative critique rather 
than an epistemological one. As with description, the critique of 
methodology has much less impact upon the interpretation of legal 
texts than it does upon interpretive work in other fields. 
D. The Unity of Discourse and the Applicability of the Critique 
The problem with legal scholarship, therefore, does not reside in 
any outmoded claims of objectivity, any positivist vision of the sort 
that the critique of methodology attacks. The field is self-consciously 
normative, and in that sense recognizes itself as a practice based on 
judgment, not a methodology based upon objectively determined rules. 
But the attack on positivism does not constitute the entire significance 
of the critique of methodology; there is also the critique's emphasis on 
collective self-awareness. According to the critique, academic dis-
course must not only abandon positivism, but must achieve self-aware-
ness of its own discourse, and reassess its features on a continuous 
basis. 
Here, the difficulty with standard legal scholarship emerges. While 
scholars have abandoned formalism as a means of justifying their ar-
guments, and have recognized the normative character of their enter-
prise, they have not been similarly critical of the discourse that they 
continue to employ. Instead, they have reflexively adopted the dis-
course of their subject matter. Legal scholars not only analyze the 
work of judges, but they also tend to think of themselves as judges, 
and to speak like judges. They address a court on the court's own 
terms, offering alternative rationales for the decision reached, or argu-
ments why a different decision was preferable. In doing so, they in-
voke the same range of justifications, based on precedent, statutory 
intent or social policy. They structure these justifications the same 
way, treating the authority of cases similarly, and discovering social 
policies by a similar methodology. They employ the same legal terms, 
and treat them with comparable levels of respect or disdain. 70 This 
shared conceptual framework between legal scholars and their subject 
69. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980); Bennett, Objectivity in Constitu-
tional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445 (1984); Brest, supra note 45, at 1090-92; Ely, supra note 66 at 
412-48; Grey, supra note 66 at 710-14. 
70. See M. DAN-CoHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 1-2 (1986). 
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matter may be referred fo as a unity of discourse.71 
Although legal scholars seem to regard this unity of discourse as 
an inevitable feature of the field, it is far from common in other disci-
plines. There is no identity of discourse between the critic and the 
author, the historian and the politician, the anthropologist and the vil-
lager or the psychologist and the individual, to say nothing of the sci-
entist and the slime mold. Typically, scholarly disciplines develop 
their own frameworks of analysis. Social scientists, even if they strive 
for an empathic understanding of the people they are studying, do not 
speak the language of their subjects when describing or evaluating 
them. Medical scholars must write in terms that are comprehensible 
to the doctors who constitute their audience, but they are studying 
diseases, not doctors. It is social scientists who study doctors, and 
while they need to understand medical terminology to do so, they 
carry out their scholarly analyses in different terms. 
This unity of discourse distinguishes standard legal scholarship 
from movements in legal scholarship that have developed a distinctive 
voice, most notably law and economics, law and literature and critical 
legal studies. Although these movements have attracted a great deal 
of attention, their work still represents a relatively small proportion of 
the total scholarly output. In addition, only law and economics has 
engaged in sustained discussion of contemporary legal issues; the 
others have been largely concerned with exploring their own theoreti-
cal justifications, or attacking law and economics. Given the preva-
lence of economics, hermeneutics, and neo-Marxism in other fields, it 
is far from surprising that these movements have emerged. The more 
surprising fact is that the bulk of legal scholarship has not developed a 
new discourse, but remains bound to the discourse of its subject 
matter. 
What renders unity of discourse problematic is that it is grounded 
in the ideology and attitudes of legal formalism, the very doctrine that 
legal scholarship has apparently abandoned. In the formalist era, 
scholars and judges shared a vision of law as a system of rules that 
could be derived from fixed, enduring principles. The effort to under-
stand these principles and derive the proper rule generated a unified 
71. This term is adapted from M. FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 14, at 21-30. Fou-
cault uses it, in the plural, to refer to certain concepts that assert the continuity or similarity of 
various phenomena. Foucault's examples include the terms tradition, influence, evolution, spirit, 
and book, as well as the divisions of knowledge such as science and literature. According to his 
view, the judiciary's unities of discourse would include tort, contract, procedure, case, precedent, 
and so forth. The point here is that there is a unity between the judiciary's "unities of discourse" 
and those of legal scholars. But since a "unity of unities of discourse" is an impossible locution, 
Foucault's terminology has been altered. 
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discourse that was simultaneously interpretive, descriptive and pre-
scriptive in its stance. It was interpretive because legal scholars, like 
judges, saw themselves as interpreting general principles that were fil-
led with meaning and worthy of sustained attention. Being universal, 
these principles were accessible to scholars, judges and anyone else 
with the legal training necessary to perceive and understand them. 
The discourse was descriptive because legal scholars recognized judges 
as fellow-interpreters, working side-by-side to translate these princi-
ples into operative legal doctrine. To the extent that such judicial ef-
forts were seen as creditable, which was often the case, a description of 
them contributed to the elaboration and development of law. And the 
discourse was prescriptive because the principles could be interpreted 
rightly or wrongly. Since the scholar and the judge based their con-
clusions on shared principles, scholars could both teach judges and 
learn from them about the proper way to decide specific issues. All 
these methods of formalist scholarship depended on the scholars' sense 
that they were engaged in a joint enterprise with the judiciary, and 
that their role was to assist judges in their interpretive task, to describe 
approvingly their valid efforts, and to correct decisively their mistaken 
ones. 
As has been stated, formalism was discredited by legal realism in a 
process that gave rise to the prescriptive approach that dominates con-
temporary legal scholarship. But as a number of observers, including 
Bruce Ackerman,72 Donald Gjerdingen,73 Thomas Grey,74 and Gary 
Peller75 have pointed out, formalism never really died, despite its re-
jection as a legal theory. It lives on as an operative methodology by 
which judges formulate decisions and as a legitimating discourse for 
those decisions. When confronted by a statutory issue, judges typi-
cally begin by parsing the language of the statute, and of subsequent 
judicial interpretations; when confronted by a common law issue, they 
tend to begin their analysis with reference to judicial precedent. They 
still speak as if statutory language and judicial decisions are an essen-
tially autonomous and comprehensive framework that can generate 
acceptably accurate results. They justify and legitimate their conclu-
sions by identifying holdings and dicta, by balancing the weight of 
authority, and by analyzing the internal logic of legal texts. And they 
72. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (1984). Professor Ackerman 
treats legal realism as an effort by the legal community in general to preserve formalist categories 
- the only ones it possessed - in the face of the transformation wrought by the New Deal. 
73. Gjerdingen, The Future of Legal Scholarship and the Search for a Modern Theory of Law, 
35 BUFFALO L. REV. 381, 395-97 (1986). 
74. Grey, supra note 58, at 47-53. 
75. Peller, supra note 61, at 1259-90. 
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continue to rely, in large measure, on the conceptual tools of tort, con-
tract, property and crime, with their informal psychology of intent, 
reasonableness, notice, and mistake. 
This is not to say that judicial decision-making has remained un-
changed since 1886. Change has occurred, but it is nothing like the 
radical transformation of· the decision-making process that modem 
theories such as law and economics or critical legal studies urge. In-
stead, it is best characterized as a gradual seepage of progressive ideas 
into the existing structure. Contemporary judges are more attuned to 
policy arguments than their formalist predecessors, more willing to 
make allowances for social inequality, and more conscious of institu-
tional relationships.76 But these evolving views do not provide a com-
prehensive framework for analysis. In most cases, they are ways of 
tempering or readjusting the existing framework and ensuring its legit-
imacy. Thus, the intellectual history of judicial decision-making in the 
twentieth century reflects the relatively gradual trends of American 
politics in general, rather than the more dramatic and mercurial devel-
opments in legal theory. Judges have retained formalist analysis be-
cause it provides them with a framework for legal reasoning, while 
modifying it in order to achieve normatively acceptable results. 
The modified formalism of judicial decisions has allowed legal 
scholars to retain the same discourse as judges, while abandoning the 
underlying theory of that discourse in favor of a consciously normative 
approach. It is true that legal scholarship now grounds its arguments 
on social policy, not on formalist notions of doctrinal coherence or 
enduring principles. But judicial discourse has itself abandoned its 
claim to those enduring principles. It still relies heavily on doctrinal, 
or coherence arguments, but it has jettisoned their formalist justifica-
tion to become an essentially pragmatic system of structured decision-
making. In the process, judicial discourse has absorbed enough social 
policy modifications to serve as points of attachment for the normative 
arguments of legal scholars. For example, a scholar who wants to ad-
vance nondoctrinal arguments about the social policy that tort law 
serves need no longer reject judicial discourse. There is enough lan-
guage about cost spreading in the decided cases, and enough modifica-
tion of the common law negligence standard, to accommodate the 
76. For characterizations of contemporary adjudicative methodology, see R. DWORKIN, 
supra note 66, at 176-86, 276-399; M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988); 
M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A CoMPARATIVE AND PoLmCAL ANALYSIS 1-64 (1981); Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme 
Court 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Levy, Realist 
Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960). 
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argument. 77 Of course, the judiciary is quite far from abandoning 
traditional tort law, but it has changed the law enough to make argu-
ments based on other principles fit within the framework of its 
discourse. 
There is also a reverse phenomenon that preserves the unity of dis-
course. Just as judicial formalism has proved sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the scholar's normative discourse, so normative dis-
course is flexible enough to assimilate the unchanged elements of judi-
cial formalism. This stems from the ability of normative discourse to 
reconstitute descriptive or interpretive arguments. The part of formal-
ism that survives unchanged in judicial discourse is the use of 
doctrinal coherence arguments; judges no longer claim to be framing 
arguments in accordance with transcendental principles, but they 
often claim that they ·are framing arguments that are derived from an 
existing body of decisional law.78 Within a normative discourse, how-
ever, scholars can recast these arguments in nonformalist terms; they 
simply assert that doctrinal coherence is a strategy designed to satisfy 
a norm of judicial restraint, or legal predictability. That is in fact how 
modern scholars tend to justify doctrinal arguments. 79 Of course, they 
have a tendency to lapse into pure doctrinalism, to make reflexive use 
of the formalist categories that are still so much a part of every law-
yer's thought process. But they would respond with normative argu-
ments if they were challenged, or otherwise induced to reflect upon 
their methodology. 
While formalism's devolution from a theoretical justification to an 
operative methodology has preserved legal scholars' ability to speak in 
the same terms as the judiciary, it has compelled an alteration of the 
voice with which they speak. An interpretive approach no longer 
makes sense for legal scholarship. Specific decisions, statutes, or regu-
lations can be interpreted, of course, but these interpretations do not 
possess intrinsic legitimacy for legal scholars. To the extent that 
judges are compelled by their position to restrict themselves to inter-
77. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1947) {Hand, J.); 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) {Tray-
nor, J.); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(Ford Pinto case). 
78. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 238-58. 
79. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 225-354; Faller, Everyman's Jurisprudence: In 
Search of a Common Sense Theory of Legal Justification, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 433 (1985); Fish, 
Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1325 (1984); Fiss, supra note 65; Greenwalt, Discretion and Judi-
cial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 359 
(1975); Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: lncrementalism or Stare De-
cisis, 2 LAW IN TRANsmoN Q. 134 (1964). Cf. text at notes 67-69 supra (normative reconstruc-
tion of constitutional originalism). 
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pretation, they are speaking in a discourse that scholars can no longer 
share. Neither scholars nor judges regard legal doctrine as being de-
rived from interpretations of enduring, transcendental principles; 
some judges may find doctrine adequate, because of its legitimating 
force, but the scholar's task is hardly limited to legitimating judicial 
decisions. A descriptive approach is similarly unappealing. This is 
not to say that legal scholarship does not contain descriptions of judi-
cial decisions; it does, and those descriptions are important because 
judges are important state officials. But pure description rarely counts 
as an academic contribution these days, because scholars do not be-
lieve that they are describing a process that runs parallel to scholarly 
analysis. As a result, essentially descriptive treatises are no longer re-
garded as leading academic contributions, and they are certainly not 
regarded as the apogee of scholarly achievement. 80 
The voice that remains to legal scholarship is the prescriptive one. 
But the range of the prescriptions has increased greatly as the modifi-
cations of formalism have expanded the boundaries of the preexisting 
legal doctrine. Thus, scholars no longer limit the basis of their pre-
scriptions to legal principles; they invoke a wide range of process val-
ues and social policy considerations. Since these are the same values 
and considerations judges use to modify their formalist tradition, how-
ever, and since judges gradually incorporate the modifications into the 
legal doctrine they employ, the unity of discourse has survived these 
alterations. Scholars may focus more heavily on the modification pro-
cess than on the doctrinal substratum, but they find a sufficient basis 
for both analysis and argument in the discourse of the decisions they 
are studying. 81 
The unity of discourse has continued as a dominant approach to 
legal scholarship without sufficient reevaluation. To be sure, the for-
malist philosophy which underlies it was discredited by an attack that 
parallels the critique of methodology's attack on positivism. In fact, it 
is this parallel development in legal scholarship that renders that at-
tack on positivism largely irrelevant to standard scholarship. But the 
critique has another element as well - the self-awareness and continu-
ous reevaluation of scholarly techniques themselves. Due to its in-
stinctive and pragmatic tenor, the legal realist attack did not include 
this theoretical element. As a result, legal realism's transformation of 
80. See Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of 
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 668-78 (1981). For several of the treatises that were 
regarded as the pinnacles of scholarship in the formalist era, see note 58 supra. 
81. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 773-80 (explaining why social science scholarship in law 
reviews remains relatively rare); Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 Y ALB 
L.J. 1113 (1981); Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1389 (1984). 
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legal scholarship was incomplete. It eliminated the formalist basis of 
the scholarship, and substituted normative argument, but it did not 
replace formalism's unity of discourse. The critique of methodology's 
significance for standard legal scholarship, therefore, is not its attack 
on positivism. Legal scholars have already won that battle on their 
own. Rather, the critique's potential is that it can complete the pro-
cess legal realism began, that it can free legal scholarship from its 
quasi-formalist unity of discourse through a process of self-awareness. 
This will enable scholars to be more effective in achieving their self-
defined objective, which is to frame persuasive recommendations for 
public decision-makers. 82 
II. THE EXISTING USES OF THE CRITIQUE 
It might appear that the effort to apply the critique of methodology 
to legal scholarship has already been undertaken. Three of the major 
movements in modern legal thought, critical legal studies, law and 
literature, and law as practical reason display direct connections to 
elements of this critique. Many aspects of critical legal studies are 
derived from critical theory, 83 and draw on hermeneutics and decon-
struction as well. 84 Law and literature invokes the hermeneutic theory 
of interpretation, and, less directly, the more generalized implications 
of this theory for human experience. 85 The idea of law as practical 
82. See Part IV infra. 
83. See, e.g., Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982); Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local 
Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Cornell, Toward a Modem/Postmodern Recon-
struction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1985); Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal 
Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984). Roberto Unger's general restatement of 
critical legal studies, supra note 55, while it does not contain either citations or a bibliography, 
seems to be directly based on Habermas, particularly KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, 
supra note 13. Both books begin by attacking objectivism, or positivism (UNGER, supra note 55, 
at 5-14, HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 67-90), fashion an alternative based upon 
collective action or understanding (UNGER, supra note 55, at 15-32; HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, 
supra note 13, at 91-160) and seek some internal dynamic through which this alternative could be 
realized in the midst of an ongoing historical process (Unger, supra note 55 at 36-42; HABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE, at 214-317). 
For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between critical theory and one representative 
critical legal studies article (Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE L.J. 1 (1984)), see Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 332-60 
(1987). 
84. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 
(1985); Frog, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); 
Levinson, supra note 67; Peller, supra note 61; Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 
1363 (1984). See Brosnan, supra note 83, at 360-88. 
Another, although probably subsidiary, source of critical legal studies is pragmatism. See, 
Singer, supra note 83 (relying on the pragmatism of R. RORTY, supra note 19). Singer's interpre-
tation of Rorty is challenged in Stick, Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 
(1986). 
85. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 45-73; J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR 
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reason draws upon the critique's view of scholarship as a social prac-
tice, whose validity claims must ultimately be evaluated by judgment 
or intuition. 86 In these efforts, therefore, might be seen the theoretical 
grounding, and perhaps the self-awareness, that was lacking in the 
legal realist attack on formalism. 
In fact, none of these movements really apply insights derived 
from the critique of methodology to legal scholarship, nor do they pro-
vide any sustained analysis of legal scholarship in general. All three 
are theories of legal decision-making, rather than theories of legal 
scholarship. They appear relevant to scholarship only because there is 
a unity of discourse between scholars and judges. Attacks on decision-
making, particularly on judicial decision-making, and most particu-
larly on the language of judicial decision-making, have surface rele-
vance to legal scholarship. But the underlying shift from formalism to 
normative discourse has eliminated any deeper applications. To the 
extent that they claim to be relevant to legal scholarship, the critical 
legal studies, law and literature and law as practical reason movements 
have been misled by the same unity of discourse that has affiicted the 
scholarship itself. Applying the insights derived from the critique of 
methodology to the problem of scholarship itself, rather than to the 
problem of legal decision-making, produces a rather different perspec-
tive from the one that any of these movements offer. 
A. Critical Legal Studies 
The critical legal studies movement, like the critique of methodol-
ogy, asserts that law is a social discourse. Its dominant discursive fea-
tures, according to critical scholars, are the assertion that it is separate 
from politics, that it is guided by authoritative texts, and that it can 
use its operative categories, like tort or contract, as a basis for coher-
ent argument. The movement is enormously complex, with many dif-
ferent strands, but most of its attacks on this legal discourse cluster 
around two basic themes. The first theme is conceptual: it asserts that 
the categories legal doctrine uses, and the claims it advances about the 
MEANING (1984); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE PoLmCS OF INTERPRETATION (W. 
Mitchell ed. 1983); Levinson, supra note 67; Weisberg, supra note 67; White, The Judicial Opin-
ion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1669 (1984). While Profes-
sor White, unlike others in this field, does not explicitly invoke the hermeneutic tradition, it 
seems to have influenced his view of literary interpretation. 
86. For explicit references, see Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367, 376-79 
(1987); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24-36 (1986); 
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 
543-49 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 58-59 
(1985). The dominant influences on this movement, however, are not continental philosophy but 
Aristotle and American political theory. 
August 1988) The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship 1867 
autonomy of that doctrine, are incoherent on their own terms. 87 The 
second theme, which is political, asserts that despite our claims of free-
dom and equality, our society is highly stratified and subtly, but 
powerfully, oppressive. Legal discourse, which figures prominently in 
the justifications for this system, thus becomes an instrumentality of 
those who dominate it. 88 
In attacking the coherence of legal categories, the ability of legal 
texts to determine governmental action, and the assertedly apolitical 
nature of doctrinal argument, the conceptual theme of the critical 
legal studies movement is attacking our legal system, but not the 
scholarship that studies it. Standard scholarship, having abandoned 
formalism, simply does not rely on legal doctrine for its validity 
claims. While it still uses the doctrinal terminology that judges use, it 
makes no assertion that this terminology is self-justifying, or objec-
tively valid. Rather, the claim of standard scholarship is that its nor-
mative arguments should be couched in doctrinal terms because these 
are the terms that are used by its primary audience. Most standard 
scholarly works, moreover, do not assert the validity of legal doctrine 
as a whole. They are arguing for the modification of that doctrine 
along paths that their normative position recommends. Thus, they do 
not rely on doctrine as a source of justification, but take it as a given 
social fact, and use it as a context for their arguments. 
An article about reforming tort law doctrine, for example, need not 
assert that the doctrine is conceptually coherent, or politically value-
free. The scholar can simply argue that the body of doctrine, in its 
present form, should change in a particular direction. She may be-
lieve, as a normative matter, that the concept of individual responsibil-
ity on which tort law rests is completely wrong, and that the whole 
system should be replaced by social insurance. On that basis, she 
could recommend an incremental change in tort law doctrine that re-
placed negligence with strict enterprise liability. 89 To be sure, a simi-
lar article could be written by. someone who believes that tort law is a 
conceptually coherent or politically desirable system, once a few de-
87. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 84; Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive 
Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591 (1981); Peller, supra note 61; Singer, supra note 83; Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 781 (1983). 
88. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, supra note 55; Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HAR':· L. 
REv. 1037 (1980); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 
205 (1979); Klare, supra note 55; Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
469 (1984). 
89. Again, the incremental nature of the suggested change would depend on a normatively 
justified respect for precedent (e.g., as a means of controlling judicial behavior). See text at notes 
67-79 supra. 
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limited modifications are made. The point is that the scholarly enter-
prise rests upon its own normative basis, whatever that is, not the 
normative basis of the doctrine it is analyzing. The apparent relevance 
of critical legal studies to legal scholarship stems from the field's unity 
of discourse with its subject matter. 
Critical legal scholars might claim that the whole concept of tort 
law is so incoherent that one cannot even talk about it in meaningful 
terms. But of course one can. The concept exists within a culturally 
established discourse, and it is coherent to the extent that the speakers 
in the discourse can agree on what it means. Only agreement is re-
quired; even if one does not believe in a consensus theory of truth, one 
can hardly dispute a consensus theory of cultural artifacts, which is 
what legal doctrines are. In other words, as long as speakers in the 
discourse agree that particular decisions constitute "tort law," they 
can meaningfully argue about whether such decisions are desirable on 
the basis of the speakers' shared norms.90 To be sure, agreement about 
a particular term might break down, at which point that term will 
either be reformulated or pass out of the discourse. But since the pro-
cess of legal scholarship includes the revision of doctrinal language, 
the existence of such revision can hardly be regarded as a fatal defect. 
The political theme of critical legal studies is essentially an attack 
on the systems of governance and control in our society. Some observ-
ers maintain that it is unrelated to the movement's "nihilist" attack on 
legal discourse; if this is correct, it would provide an easy way to sepa-
rate this political theme from legal scholarship.91 In fact, there is a 
90. This point is made by Professor Stick in his critique of the nihilist wing of critical legal 
studies. Stick, supra note 84. See also, Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1691-
95 (1986). But in this article the argument applies exclusively to legal scholarship. The ability of 
a group of speakers to achieve a consensus about the meaning of terms can render a discourse 
coherent. That is a necessary precondition for scholarly debate, particularly if one follows 
Habermas' view that scholarly communication is designed to produce subjective agreement by 
means of reasoned argument (i.e., "understanding"). J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 
supra note 13, at 287. But it is not as clear that a consensus about meaning is necessary for state 
officials to act. Indeed, in some cases, such a consensus, if established by those who exercise 
power, can act as an instrument of oppression by closing off routes of opposition. See M. FOU-
CAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 14, at 257-308; HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 67-
90; MARCUSE, supra note 12. That is why Habermas is so concerned to identify the 
"emancipatory interest" that can emerge from within the dense medium of consensus, and why 
Unger is equally concerned to establish "destabilization rights," see, UNGER, supra note 55, at 
52-56. 
91. The view that the nihilist aspect of critical legal studies is unrelated to its political as-
pects, and useless for constructing a legal theory, is advanced in R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 
76-85, 266-75. See also Stick, supra note 84. 
Dworkin bases his argument on a distinction between the view that there are no objective 
interpretations and the view that there is no coherent interpretation for a particular set of social 
practices. The first he calls external skepticism, the second, global internal skepticism. External 
skepticism is irrelevant, he says, because the interpretive process of legal decision-making is an 
established practice that does not require commitment to an absolute or metaphysical objectivity. 
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close connection between the two themes. Critical legal studies, like 
the critical theory from which it is derived, sees the use of a rationale 
that lacks inherent justification as a cause and symptom of social 
abuse. First, it asserts that claims about the apolitical, coherent and 
determinative nature of law are necessarily a means of justifying the 
status quo, particularly its regime of private property that relies so 
heavily on judicial enforcement.92 A breakdown in this means of justi-
fication reveals that the status quo emerges from the self-interest of the 
class that it favors, rather than from any general normative agreement. 
Second, as Habermas suggests, the mere assertion that legal doctrine is 
apolitical, coherent and determinative is itself a form of oppression -
not the oppression of one class by another, but the oppression of our 
moral, or emancipatory instincts by a regime of technocratic objectiv-
ism. And if judges no longer believe that legal doctrine truly possesses 
these "emancipatory" characteristics, but simply adopt it as an opera-
tive methodology, their attitude can be regarded as a misuse of social 
symbols and communication that implies both the class-oriented and 
technocratic modes of oppression.93 
Despite its connection to critical legal studies' conceptual theme, 
the movement's political theme is not particularly relevant to legal 
scholarship. Even though this political theme validly focuses on legal 
Id. at 80-85, 266-67. Global internal skepticism, although relevant, is questionable, in his view, 
because it assumes that competing principles are the same as contradictory principles, which is 
not necessarily true according to Dworkin. So, global internal skepticism fails to appreciate that 
the interpretive task is specifically designed to prioritize and integrate the conflict of principles on 
which this skepticism rests. Id. at 271-75, 440 n.19, 441 n.20. 
The difficulty is that Dworkin assumes the very point that the critical legal studies movement 
places at issue, namely, the political legitimacy of the judiciary. If the judiciary is legitimate, 
then we must distinguish between proper and improper decisions, and resolve conflicts between 
principles, rather than merely announcing them. That would indeed render the nihilist attack 
irrelevant; one can only take a constructive stance toward a concededly legitimate decision-
maker. But critical legal studies challenges judicial legitimacy, and its two elements can be 
viewed as two different kinds of challenges. First, it offers a political analysis, which attempts to 
demonstrate that judges are members of a morally unacceptable state. Second, it offers a legal 
analysis, which attempts to show that existing legal doctrine is incoherent (Dworkin's internal 
skepticism) and that any body of thought that is organized as legal doctrine will inevitably be 
incoherent (Dworkin's external skepticism). The legal analysis clearly follows from, and sup-
ports the political analysis. Once one recognizes that nihilist writing relates to the project of 
challenging, or at least reevaluating the political legitimacy of judges, Dworkin's criticism seems 
unpersuasive. 
92. See, e.g., HOROWnz, supra note 55; UNGER, supra note 55, at 5-14; Dalton, supra note 
84. 
93. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 87-90; J. HABERMAS, Technical Progress, 
supra note 36; J. HABERMAS, Dogmatism, Reason and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in Our 
Scientific Civilization, in J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 253-56; 
Habermas, The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion, in TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 
62 (J. Shapiro trans. 1971); M. HORKHEIMER & T. ADORNO, supra note 12, at 31-57; M. 
HoRKHEIMER, EcLIPSE, supra note 12, at 76-82. See generally note 36 supra (citing sources that 
attack "objectivism" as foreclosing self-knowledge or social transformation). 
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discourse, the attack depends upon the use of that discourse by power 
holders, such as judges. Judges do not simply express their views 
when writing a decision, as both Robert Cover94 and Richard Posner95 
have pointed out; they transfer tracts of land, confer or deny monetary 
benefits, and send men with guns crashing through the doors of pri-
vate homes. It is this exercise of power that requires a definitive con-
nection between the power holders' discourse and their justification for 
action. What exempts legal scholarship, but not legal decision-mak-
ing, from the political strand of critical legal studies scholarship, is 
that scholarship, while it sometimes justifies state power, does not ex-
ercise that power. Consequently, it is not subject to the same moral 
obligations: we expect scholars to be sincere, but there is no underly-
ing set of actions that their language is required to reveal or explain. 
The thrust of the political theme of critical legal studies is to challenge 
the legitimacy of legal power-holders on the basis of their discourse; 
to evaluate every member of mainstream society in the same terms 
simply trivializes the challenge, and diffuses the special moral obliga-
tion of those who deploy force or control material resources. 
Critical legal scholars might assert that standard scholarship, even 
if it does not rest directly upon the normative premises of legal doc-
trine, or try to justify the doctrine's use, is condemned by its complic-
ity. In translating their arguments into doctrinal terms, this argument 
would run, legal scholars are supporting and legitimating the norms 
embedded in the doctrine. Or, more starkly, a discipline which frames 
prescriptions for an oppressive regime can be regarded as a party to 
that process of oppression. This is a familiar claim, but it is highly 
complex. To be sustained, it requires a serious analysis of the social 
role of the scholarship in question, its relationship to its audience, its 
relationship to its subject matter, and its own social dynamics as an 
academic discipline. To date, no such analysis of legal scholarship has 
been advanced. Its absence results from the fact that the critical legal 
studies movement has accepted, and to some extent been blinded by, 
the unity of discourse between scholars and judges. Because the two 
groups use the same terminologies, it is easy to conclude that they 
employ the same method of justification. But this is not the case; 
scholars and government officials are in different moral positions, even 
if they speak in similar or identical discourses. Thus, one cannot sim-
ply assume that legal scholarship that speaks to the judiciary is either 
assisting or legitimating it. 
94. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 
20 GA. L. REV. 815 (1986). 
95. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1370-71 (1986). 
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In fact, the hypothesis that legal scholarship is an instrumentality 
of social control does not seem to be a particularly promising one. 
The discourse of the scholarship is explicitly normative, and places in 
issue those very attitudes and mechanisms that constitute the structure 
of control. Formalist legal scholars may have supported the tort law 
system, but modern legal scholars debate it. The debate is carried out 
in terms of basic questions about social organization, economic effi-
ciency, personal responsibility, and the role of law.96 One can always 
imagine a higher level of debate, from which the existing scholarship 
seems limited, and thus an effort to support a certain status quo. But 
the real issue is whether that higher level would be meaningful in our 
existing cultural context. Critical legal scholars who have attempted 
to reach this level, by treating all existing scholarship as one particular 
point of view, have generally found that they cannot maintain that 
altitude for any useful period of time. They either drift off into vague 
claims about unimagined alternatives,97 or fall back into proposals 
that are little different from progressive liberalism.98 
The inability of critical legal studies to provide a critique of pre-
scriptive legal scholarship is underscored by the rather striking ab-
sence of such a critique from the philosophic sources it invokes. The 
political or neo-Marxist theme of critical legal studies is most closely 
related to the Frankfurt School, while the conceptual or "nihilist" 
theme draws its inspiration largely from French deconstruction. But 
96. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (reevaluation of tort law in 
terms of normative choices and economic efficiency); Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41 Mo. 
L. REV. 695 (1982) (arguing that concept of negligence should be replaced by principles of au-
tonomy and equality); Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(1973) (reanalyzing negligence rules in terms of economic efficiency); Cooter & Ulen, An Eco-
nomic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986) Gustifying emerging 
doctrine on economic grounds); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 
(1973) (recommending fault rules be replaced with strict liability); Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 
73 CALIF. L. REv. 755 (1985) (arguing that compensation for accidents must be rethought in 
terms of a democratic community of mutual care and respect); Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior 
and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 677 (1985) (deriving tort rules from psycholog-
ical analysis of individual behavior); Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
555 (1985) (recommending abolition of tort law, on grounds that it fails to deter or compensate 
effectively, and substitution of social insurance scheme). 
97. For explicit recognitions that these alternatives are indeed unimagined, see Brest, supra 
note 45, at 1109; Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REv. 127, 197-98 (1984); 
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 83, at 1394-403 (1984). 
98. Roberto Unger's general statement of the critical legal studies movement, UNGER, supra 
note 55 ends up championing greater political accountability of government officials, id. at 32, a 
shift from equity financing of corporations to publicly funded debt financing, id. at 35, the expan-
sion of individual rights, id. at 39-40, the recognition of entitlements to greater participation in 
government and to certain economic benefits, id., and the expansion of interdisciplinary studies 
in law school, id. at 112-13. This is not to demean Unger's recommendations, which are both 
comprehensive and refreshingly specific, but only to indicate how securely they fit within the 
existing scholarly discourse. 
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the Frankfurt School does not really offer a critique of normative dis-
course; it is positivist discourse, particularly as it appears in technol-
ogy and social science, that incites its members' ire.99 Habermas, in 
many ways the most direct philosophic progenitor of critical legal 
studies, concentrates his attack on the specifically positivist features of 
social and natural science. Not only is normative discourse excluded 
from this attack, but it lies at the center of the affirmative vision he 
advances. For Habermas, hope resides in the possibility of 
emancipatory discourse, which he explicitly links to self-reflection and 
to psychoanalysis.100 The analysis of social norms that characterizes 
standard legal scholarship today would seem to be a practical applica-
tion of the emancipatory pr~cess he envisions. It compels us to evalu-
ate our governing structures, and explicitly combats the view that 
technical knowledge can generate our social goals. In other words, the 
normative analysis of law, unlike law itself, would be regarded as 
delegitimating, rather than legitimating, precisely because of its poten-
tial for producing social self-awareness. 
Deconstruction would appear to be a more promising basis for a 
critique of legal scholarship, since its critique is not limited to positiv-
ism. But there are other limits to the deconstructive approach. While 
Derrida articulates a rather devastating attack on established and as-
sumed dichotomies, he believes the categories constituting these di-
chotomies can never be escaped. 101 What he offers, therefore, is a 
system for continuous reevaluation of existing categories, 102 essentially 
the task that modem legal scholarship has undertaken. 103 Because the 
99. See, e.g., HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 3-5, 67-90; HABERMAS, Technical 
Progress, supra note 36; HORKHEIMER, CRmCAL THEORY, supra note 12, at 194-210; 
HORKHEIMER, EcLIPSE, supra note 12, at 61-82; MARCUSE, supra note 12, at 144-99. A similar 
attack on positivist discourse is advanced by Foucault. See FOUCAULT, ARCHAELOGY, supra 
note 14; FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 14, at 195-308. Foucault, who seems to regard 
every social phenomena as an expression of oppressive power, does extend this attack to certain 
modes of normative discourse. See id. at 73-131. But even here, he emphasizes that scientific or 
positivist aspirations of this discourse, and his general, or theoretical critique are explicitly lim-
ited to positive social science. FOUCAULT, ARCHAELOGY, supra note 14, at 14-17. 
100. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION supfa note 13, at 254-71. 
101. See DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 15, at 5-65. DERRIDA, WRITING, supra 
note 15, at 3-30, 278-93; id. at 281: ("[W)e cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we 
cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing 
against this complicity .... "). 
102. DERRIDA, WRmNG, supra note 15, at 28 (emphasis in original): 
Emancipation from this language must be attempted. But not as an attempt at emancipation 
from it, for this is impossible unless we forget our history. Rather, as the dream of emanci-
pation. Nor as emancipation from it, which would be meaningless and would deprive us of 
the light of meaning. Rather, as resistance to it, as far as is possible. 
103. This does not mean that Derrida's approach has nothing to teach legal scholars, but 
only that it does not invalidate their basic enterprise, as it exists today. In fact, deconstruction 
seems like a particularly useful technique for legal scholars because it deals with the relationship 
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reality of law is so heavily linguistic, the normative debate that charac-
terizes modem scholarship necessarily focuses on the contingency of 
legal categories. The reality of the distinction between tort and con-
tract, 104 or between property and privileges, 105 is precisely what is at 
issue among legal scholars. Thus, deconstruction is more 'a descrip-
tion of contemporary legal scholarship than a critique of it; 106 what 
distinguishes standard legal scholarship from critical legal studies 
from this perspective, is the intensity of its deconstructive efforts, not 
the basic stance that it adopts. Here again, the intellectual sources 
that provide the critical legal studies movement with a critique of law 
itself does not serve as a critique of legal scholarship. 107 
between the terms we use and our general conceptual frameworks. J.M. Balkin suggests these 
possibilities in Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987). 
104. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 58; Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the 
Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983); Calabresi & Hirschotr, Toward a Test for · 
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: 
The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1985). See also I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL 
CONTRACT (1980) (challenging dichotomy between contract and noncontractual business 
relations). 
105. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Cohen, supra note 59; Llewellyn, Through 
Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. 159 (1938); Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Peller argues, in a persuasive and explicitly deconstructionalist analysis, 
that American legal thought is dominated by the subject/object dichotomy, the view that there 
exists a separate private or public realm, one of which takes lexical and causal priority over the 
other. Peller, supra note 61, at 1259-74. This is probably true, but it also has been extensively 
debated in legal scholarship. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERIT (rev. ed. 1968); Post, Between Governance and Management: The His-
tory and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987); Symposium, The Public/ 
Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289-609 (1982). As with the other examples, Peller's 
analysis is a critique of legal decision-making (which is what he intends) but not of legal 
scholarship. 
106. The deconstructive arguments of the critical legal studies movement do not acquire 
their political force from deconstructive theory itself. Rather, their political force comes from 
the nature of the texts that are being deconstructed; namely, judicial opinions that claim to derive 
political legitimacy from the coherence of their reasoning. As Balkin points out, see note 103 
supra, Derrida's work itself is an attack on our conception of truth, not on a political position, 
because it focuses on other scholarly works in fields such as linguistics (Saussure), psychology 
(Freud) and philosophy (Foucault, Husserl). In other words, deconstruction is a critical tech-
nique, whose political significance depends largely on the nature of its object. 
107. Another overlap between the contemporary analysis of scholarship and critical legal 
studies involves structuralism. This relationship is discussed in Heller, supra note 97. Heller 
associates critical legal studies with post-structuralist thought: it accepts the structuralist vision 
of a self as the cultural artifact, but rejects the philosophic implications of that vision in favor of 
some form of conscious social action. In this sense, it treats structuralism the same way that the 
critique of methodology does, incorporating its insights, but adding the element of self-aware-
ness. Heller argues that legal scholars, specifically critical legal scholars, can play a role by 
delegitimating existing institutional arrangements and their theoretical justifications. Id. at 182-
92. The way to do this, he suggests, is not to propose an alternative theory, but to replace the 
existing approach by "a local set of theoretical practices" that are "analyzed as nothing more 
than one system of practices among others, with dynamics of reproduction and environmental 
interaction similar to those of nonsymbolic practices." Id. at 196. Again, if this is the lesson of 
structuralist and post-structuralist thought, it does not provide a criticism of legal scholarship, 
whatever it asserts about the use of theory by power-holding officials. Contemporary scholarship 
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B. Law and Literature 
The law and literature movement is less obviously an applicatipn 
of the critique of methodology than critical legal studies. In fact, 
traditional interpretation, which sought to find objective meanings in 
received literary texts, would seem to be just as relevant to legal analy-
sis as the more modem belief that meaning is constructed within the 
individual's horizon of understanding, or through the intersubjective 
understanding of an interpretive community. But traditional interpre-
tation provides law only with an evocative analogy, 108 like the com-
parison between judges and priests. Modem interpretive theory, on 
the other hand, supplies an entire method of analysis, a vision of 
judges and lawyers as applying existing texts to current circumstances 
in a constrained and yet creative way. 109 It thus offers an enticing 
middle ground between the narrowness of strict construction and the 
nihilism of the legal realists. 
Thus, while critical legal studies invokes the critique of methodol-
ogy to attack our legal status quo, the law and literature movement 
invokes this same critique to justify it. 110 But the justification, like the 
attack, is primarily applicable to law itself, and not to legal scholar-
ship. Its apparent relevance to scholarship arises, once again, from the 
unity of discourse between scholars and judges. At first, it might ap-
pear that the result of this perceived unity is that the law and literature 
movement would treat judges as powerless scholars, engaged in a po-
lite and thoughtful effort to be "ideal readers" of legal texts or to cre-
ate the best possible meaning for those texts. 111 In response, the 
proponents of this movement point out that the judges' adoption of a 
tends to treat theory precisely as a localized practice, because it has abandoned the grand gener-
alities of formalism. For example, Heller trenchantly critiques the concept of property rights in 
legal decisions, using a post-structuralist analysis, id. at 174-81, but the existence and structure of 
those rights is a point at issue in modern scholarship, not an underlying assumption of its theory. 
108. See generally B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN 
NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 338 (M. Hall ed. 1947) j Axelrod, Law 
and the Humanities: Notes from Underground, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1976); Llewellyn, On 
the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942); Smith, Law and the 
Humanities: A Preface, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 223 (1976). 
109. As Miller points out, literary criticism in general is too varied, or diffuse, to provide a 
united frame work of analysis. Miller, Book Review, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 255-56 (1985). The 
current movement derives its force from the range of modern interpretative theories that focus on 
the interaction of the reader and the text. 
110. The tendency of the law and literature movement to legitimate existing judicial practice 
is illustrated by R. DWORKIN, supra note 66; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 
527 (1982); Weisberg, supra note 67; White, supra note 85. However, techniques of literary 
criticism have been used for other purposes. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 67 (critical legal 
studies analysis using literary techniques). 
111. R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 49-53; White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835, 
868-70 (1986); White, supra note 85, at 868-70; Weisberg, supra note 67, at 979-85. 
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literary approach is a political act, a means of mediating between slav-
ish submission to the language of the text, and cavalier dismissal of the 
language in favor of their predilections.112 This response avoids the 
error of treating judges as scholars, to be sure, but only by succumbing 
to the converse error of treating scholars as judges. 
In fact, scholars play a different social role, because they do not 
exercise coercive power. There is no particular reason for scholars to 
seek the balance that is appropriate for judges, unless they find it justi-
fied on independent normative grounds. They commit no act of social 
callousness by being slavish, or of political irresponsibility by being 
cavalier; they simply offer legal decision-makers an argument for a 
particular position. In other words, the law and literature movement 
has articulated reasons judges should adopt an interpretive stance to-
ward legal texts or legal principles, but they have not advanced any 
reasons why scholars should adopt this stance. They have demon-
strated that such a stance is possible, that scholars can read Judge A's 
decision the way they believe Judge B should read Judge A's decision. 
But there is no necessity for the scholars to do so, unless they are 
committed to the unity of discourse. 
An interpretive stance is not only unnecessary for legal scholars, 
its widespread adoption would be positively harmful. Interpretation is 
a self-imposed constraint, which sets the boundaries of inquiry no fur-
ther than the culturally possible understandings of the text in ques-
tion. 113 But the scholar is often in a position to go beyond the text, 
and ask whether it should be ignored or altered rather than inter-
preted. This would certainly be true of a work that addresses the legis-
lature as opposed to the judiciary, for the legislature is primarily a 
creator of texts, not an interpreter of them. Even in cases where the 
scholar is addressing the judiciary, moreover, there is always a ques-
tion about which texts are relevant, and how those texts should be 
treated. We always want to know whether the decision should emerge 
from our understanding of the text, or from non textual arguments like 
social policy. No matter how contextual our theory of interpretation, 
the question always remains, because social policy is a separate mode 
of argument that simply cannot be encompassed by interpretation, 
112. R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 190-216. 
113. This is Habennas' basic criticism of Gadamer's hermeneutics. See HABERMAS, COM-
MUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 130-41; Habennas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and 
Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335 (F. Dallmayr & T. McCarthy eds. 
1977). One ofHabennas' arguments is that Gadamer assumes that the text, or the author of the 
text, is somehow superior to the reader, and entitled to respect on that basis. This may be incor-
rect, but if so, it is only because Gadamer is using literature as an example of an essentially 
nonliterary analysis of understanding. See text at note 114 infra. 
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even if interpretation can be defined so broadly that it reaches similar 
results. 
Consequently, the interpretive stance must continually be argued 
for. It is a perfectly respectable argument, as a prescription for judges, 
but that does not render it a useful prescription for scholars. The 
scholar's task is to carry out that very argument about the value of 
interpretation in specific cases; to adopt interpretation as a scholarly 
stance would constrain, if not preclude the argument, and truncate the 
entire enterprise. Nor is this merely a matter of high legal theory, that 
can be settled at the metalevel and then, if the law and literature move-
ment has its way, adopted as a universal stance. It is present at every 
level of legal scholarship. The most mundane discussions of a legal 
text, down to the lowly case note, remain a contest between interpreta-
tion and its alternatives. And this problem can never be interred, be-
cause it is the legal scholar's audience that possesses power, not the 
text, and that audience can always act according to some other 
principle.114 
Although law and literature invokes the hermeneutic strand of the 
critique of methodology, the evolution of modem hermeneutics points 
toward an approach to legal scholarship which is quite remote from 
literary criticism. Hermeneutics originated in the study of the Bi-
ble, 115 but it does not refer to the substance of Biblical interpretation. 
That is exegesis. Hermeneutics is the study of the principles that make 
exegesis or interpretation possible; in other words, it began as an anal-
ysis of Biblical interpretation itself. 116 From there, the concept ex-
panded to the analysis of how any text is understood, and then to a 
general analysis ofunderstanding. 117 While hermeneutics continues to 
be concerned with understanding texts, it is by no means limited to 
literary products. More importantly, its central theme is that we must 
approach the text, if it is a text we are trying to understand, with our 
total being. The process of understanding does not depend on a tech-
nique but an experience, an experience that requires our participation 
114. See Miller, supra note 109, at 257-58. For the related argument that legal scholars 
should not be concerned with the literary elegance of their writing, but with its conceptual coher-
ence, see Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599 (1986). 
115. See, e.g., E. BLACKMAN, BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION (1957); R. GRANT, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE (rev. ed. 1963); J. WOOD, THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE BIBLE (1958). 
116. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 153-73; R. PALMER, HERME-
NEUTICS 34-38 (1969). 
117. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD supra note 11, at 151-341. 
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as historically, culturally and temporally grounded human beings. 118 
To be sure, the law and literature movement, which is influenced 
by hermeneutics, does contain numerous passages that reflect this 
broader vision of interpretation.119 But to the extent it does, it ceases 
to have any particular relationship to literature, or to the process of 
literary criticism, and simply merges into the more general theory of 
socially constructed meaning.120 In fact that is Gadamer's position; he 
regards art as a particularly good example of his theory, but the sub-
ject of his theory is not art, but understanding.121 Thus, Gadamer 
does not think that a judge should act like a literary critic. His view, 
rather, is that the literary critic should act like a judge, who "adapts 
the transmitted law to the needs of the present."122 Legal scholars, 
presumably, would have even more latitude, since they would be eval-
uating the very process of relying on a text. 
The idea that scholars should approach legal texts armed with a set 
of literary techniques is thus the antithesis of modem hermeneutics. 
Rather, the scholar's task is to relate the text to the totality of our 
historical and cultural experience. Questions about the political func-
tion of the text, its historical setting, and its practical effects are as 
relevant as the judge's use of legal reasoning. Hermeneutics, in other 
words, is a theory of understanding that applies to the entire range of 
118. 
[Hermeneutics] denotes the basic being-in-motion of there-being [Heidegger's Dasein] 
which constitutes its finiteness and historicity, and hence includes the whole of its experi-
ence of the world. . . . [T]he experience of the work of art always fundamentally surpasses 
any subjective horizon of interpretation, whether that of the artist or that of the recipient. 
Id. at xviii-xix. 
119. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 167-75; White, Law and Rhetoric, Rhetoric as 
Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985). 
120. See Moore, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Legal Theory, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 453, 467-
70 (1987); Stick, Literary Imperialism: Assessing the Results of Dworkin's Interpretive Turn in 
Law's Empire 34 UCLA L. REV. 371, 376-401 (1986). 
121. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 11, at xix to xx. 
122. Id. at 292 ("Legal hermeneutics is able to point out what the real procedure of the 
human sciences is. Here we have the model for the relationship between past and present that we 
are seeking.") For a direct application of Gadamer's approach to the judicial role, see Eskridge, 
supra note 65. 
Gadamer's approach, although broader than the law and literature movement, nonetheless 
gives more deference to the text than scholars need to give. The reason, as stated above, is that 
the legal scholar is not bound by the constraints implicit in the exercise of a judicial role. That is, 
being bound by the text, to some extent, is part of the judge's job description, but not part of the 
scholar's. Gadamer does not make this distinction, probably because he does not have an elabo-
rated theory of p"olitical power. Indeed, he overlooks the entire body of prescriptive, or standard 
legal scholarship. His extended discussion of legal hermeneutics concerns only judges and legal 
historians. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 11, at 289-305. Gadamer's relevance 
to legal scholarship lies in his general theory, not in his discussion of legal hermeneutics. The 
legal scholar would be subject to constraints, in Gadamer's view, but they would be the general 
constraints of tradition (he uses the term "prejudice"), not the particular constraints of legal 
texts. See id. at 235-74. 
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issues raised in standard legal scholarship. It seems fair to say that it 
refuses to treat literature as literature, in the belles-letters sense, and it 
certainly would not recommend that legal decisions be treated in that 
fashion. 
C. Law as Practical Reason 
A third theme in modern legal thought that is related to the cri-
tique of methodology may be called the law as practical reason move-
ment. This is a more amorphous phenomenon than either critical 
legal studies or law and literature, perhaps because it is newer, perhaps 
because its members have not consciously identified themselves as a 
group, or perhaps because its content discourages its articulation as a 
movement or an ideology. It is characterized by its vision of the law 
as an embedded social practice, whose provisions are supported by a 
complex set of norms, traditions, and pragmatic compromises that 
lack overarching theoretical justifications, but can be evaluated by 
judgment or intuition. 123 Politically, the practical reason movement is 
closer to law and literature than to critical legal studies, since it is at 
least incrementalist, if not directly supportive of the status quo. 124 But 
it differs from both movements in that it does not represent a sharp 
break with the discourse of standard scholarship. In fact, it merges 
into standard scholarship quite smoothly, since its defining feature is a 
mood, and not a method. 
Clearly, the practical reason movement adopts the critique of 
methodology's conception of academic fields as socially embedded 
practices. 125 But there is a much less direct relationship between the 
two than there would appear to be at first. The problem, once again, 
lies in the unity of discourse. Practical reason is a prescription for 
legal decision-makers, and specifically for judges. It makes a great 
deal of sense to regard judges as decision-makers who operate within a 
tradition, using judgment and intuition to resolve the succession of 
issues that are presented to them. Of course, it also makes sense to 
123. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. 
R.E.v. 1615 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason]; Farber & Frickey, The Juris-
prodence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987); Hawthorn, Practical Reason and Social 
Democracy: Reflections on Unger's Passion and Politics, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 766 (1987); 
Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prodence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985); Michelman, 
supra note 86; Sherry, supra note 86; Sunstein, supra note 86; Wellman, Practical Reasoning and 
Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985). A new, 
albeit, partial, recruit, is Richard Posner. See Posner, The Jurisprodence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 827 (1988). 
124. See Kronman, supra note 123, at 1608-10 (disputing conservative nature of practical 
reason, but treating it as incrementalist). 
125. See note 86 supra. 
August 1988] The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship 1879 
regard judges as powerful state officials who use coercive force to 
maintain the established order, the way critical legal studies does, and 
to regard them as interpreters of authoritative texts, the way the law 
and literature movement does. But it does not make ~ much sense to 
use any of these perspectives when assessing legal scholarship. The 
value of the practical reason perspective, like the value of critical legal 
studies and law and literature, depends upon the fact that judges exer-
cise state power. If we want judges to use judgment, it is because that 
is their socially assigned role, or the best way for them to reach just 
decisions. But scholars have a different role, and their use of the same 
discourse as judges is a defect in their approach, not a basis for holding 
them to the same standards of analysis. 
In fact, practical reason does not provide a particularly good pro-
gram for legal scholarship. One difficulty with it is its lack of content; 
it clearly rejects claims to absolute truth, or abstract theoretical uni-
ties, but its affirmative program is less certain. The deeper difficulty, 
for present purposes, is that practical judgment, whatever its value for 
judges, is the wrong approach for scholars. The scholar's specialty is 
not practical judgment but structured argument, not general intuition 
but specialized knowledge, not ad hoc decision-making but systematic 
analysis. Scholars who join judges in the use of practical reason are 
likely to find themselves, as Meir Dan-Cohen suggests, acting "as a 
kind of deputy-judge, presiding over moot courts, or a shadow lawyer 
writing mock briefs for hypothetical or past disputes."126 
This is not the approach that the critique of methodology suggests. 
It is true that the critique characterizes academic scholarship as a 
practice carried out by a community whose ultimate choices depend 
on judgment, not fixed rules. But the community is a community of 
scholars, not of society in general, and the choices are being made 
between elaborated theories or rival methodologies. The defining fea-
ture of a scholarly community is that it has a unique and specialized 
discourse, with its own rules for advancing arguments, and for deter-
mining their validity. Judgment serves to provide criteria for evaluat-
ing those underlying rules, not as a substitute for academic discourse, 
or the methodology which it employs. The type of judgment Kuhn is 
concerned with, for example, is whether the wave theory or the parti-
cle theory best accounts for the observed behavior of light. 127 This 
judgment could only be made by someone who is well versed in the 
academic discourse that has generated the rival theories. 
126. M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 70, at 1-2. Cf Hyland, supra note 114 (arguing for the 
importance of concepts in legal discourse). 
127. See KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS supra note 8, at 154. 
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It is true, therefore, that judgment has a role to play in both judi-
cial decision-making and legal scholarship, but different kinds of judg-
ment are involved. One is the judgment that is exercised by a public 
official, who is required to resolve disputes between parties with con-
flicting interests, and to declare rules by which future disputes can be 
resolved. The other is the evaluation of scholars' arguments about the 
basis on which judicial decision-makers and other public officials 
should act. These two types of judgment will tend to merge only when 
there is no independent scholarly discourse, when scholars are advanc-
ing the same arguments, and using the same evaluative criteria, as the 
subject matter they are studying. But there is nothing in the concept 
of a practice, as advanced by the critique of methodology, that en-
dorses such a merger. If anything it implies the opposite: that each 
distinctive community has its own practice, and that the judgments 
within each practice can only be made by those who are part of the 
particular community, and speak in its distinctive voice. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF STANDARD LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
To summarize thus far, the first part of this Article discussed the 
relationship between the critique of methodology and standard legal 
scholarship. The critique's attack on positivism, it was suggested, is 
not relevant to legal scholarship because the field has abandoned its 
own formalist claim to objectivity in favor of a normatively-based pre-
scriptive discourse. But the affirmative emphasis of the critique on 
collective self-awareness is highly relevant, because legal scholarship 
retains an unexamined unity of discourse with its subject matter as a 
result of its formalist origins. Part II then argued that the three con-
temporary bodies of legal thought that invoke the critique of method-
ology have in fact ignored its central insight for the analysis of legal 
scholarship. Rather than developing a critical self-awareness of the 
field's unity of discourse, they reflexively adopt it. Thus, critical legal 
studies, law and literature, and law as practical judgment tend to con-
flate law itself with legal scholarship and assume that the two can be 
evaluated with a single theory. In fact, the unity of discourse, the 
shared framework of analysis between legal scholars and their subject 
matter, is an atavism that merits skeptical assessment. 
The following two Parts of the Article apply the critique of meth-
odology, particularly its emphasis on self-awareness, to standard legal 
scholarship. Part III is essentially critical: it analyzes the unity of 
discourse, and illustrates its deleterious effects on the scholarship's 
ability to achieve its self-defined purposes. The next Part then 
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presents an affirmative program for legal scholarship, based on the 
self-awareness that the critique suggests. 
The analysis presented in this part is an internal one. Rather than 
imposing a purpose or criterion on legal scholarship, it suggests that 
the scholarship should become aware of its own purposes, and use 
them as a standard for evaluation. As previously discussed, legal 
scholarship is a practice, whose discourse consists largely of prescrip-
tions that scholars address to public decision-makers for the purpose 
of persuading those decision-makers to adopt specified courses of ac-
tion.128 This does not mean that the brute fact of influence is the prin-
ciple measure of academic quality; too many adventitious and strategic 
factors intervene between a scholarly work and its reception by public 
decision-makers. Rather, the concept of influencing decision-makers 
becomes a way of structuring the practice. Quality is determined on 
an internal basis, by the scholars' perception that the work ought to 
persuade, or that it would persuade if its audience were a rational deci-
sion-maker. The effectiveness of standard legal scholarship, in its to-
tality, can be evaluated according to this same criterion. 
A. The Unity of Discourse and the Nature of Prescription 
The greatest single impediment to legal scholarship's ability to 
achieve its self-defined purpose is its unity of discourse. This places 
two major limitations on the content of the scholarship's prescriptive 
statements. First, the normative basis for the statements will often be 
unclear. Judges have a certain commitment to normative clarity, but 
they have a countervailing need, as public officials, to justify their ex-
ercise of power. The process of justification is often better served by 
leaving the awkward unsaid and the incongruent unexplained, by gen-
erating a sort of normative haze in which implications drift about 
without coherent moorings. Thus, judges often declare that they are 
basing their decision on precedenti but that social policy supports their 
reading of the precedents, and that the precedents were not very clear 
128. It might be assumed that critical legal studies, being a self-consciously radical approach, 
does not exhibit this orientation toward existing decision-makers. In fact, that is precisely its 
orientation. Unlike orthodox Marxism, a tradition notably absent from legal scholarship, critical 
legal studies does not address a revolutionary class, like the proletariat. Rather, it follows critical 
theory in relying on an immanent critique, an effort to demonstrate to existing decision-makers 
the inherent contradictions of their own approach. See HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 
13, at 274-300; J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); HORKHEIMER, EcLIPSE,supra note 
12. This sort of critique becomes particularly plausible, or perhaps enticing, when directed to-
ward liberal decision-makers, who feel an obligation to justify their actions in rational discourse, 
and are sympathetic to claims based on equality and freedom. Critics of the movement have 
noted the fairly traditional nature of this appeal, see Brosnan, supra note 83, at 352-57; Johnson, 
Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 266-80 (1984). 
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anyway, and besides, since judges created these precedents in the first 
place, judges can change them. To the extent that legal scholars speak 
in the same terms judges do, they will tend to become immersed in the 
same normative farrago. They strive to be clearer, of course, but the 
judicial style acts as a counterweight, if not a positive temptation. 
Thus, arguments that reflect rather different normative perspectives 
tend to agglutinate into a single, turgid mass, without much internal 
structure or conceptual differentiation. 
A second limitation that the unity of discourse places on scholarly 
prescriptions is that it tends to restrict their empirical basis, their abil-
ity to use the kinds of materials that other disciplines recognize as 
data. Prescriptions themselves are normative, not empirical, of 
course, but they often rely on empirical data to explain their conse-
quences. Since very few normative arguments in our society can be 
freed from consequentialist justifications, these consequences are im-
portant.129 In addition, many legal prescriptions are directed toward 
results that require empirical analysis to achieve. We may agree that 
fairness to consumers is more important than economic growth, but 
we need to know precisely which laws will carry out that choice. The 
result is that norms and consequences become closely intertwined; our 
normative choices have pragmatic limitations, while our pragmatic 
strategies have normative reverberations. 
Judicial discourse is ill-suited to explore these empirical issues. To 
begin with, an empirical haze may be as useful for maintaining legiti-
macy as a normative one. Judges who are devoted to the principle of 
free speech on moral grounds, for example, generally assume that it 
will produce precisely the instrumental results that they desire.130 
Even if judges are genuinely interested in empirical data, their formal-
ist discourse continues to suggest the primacy of doctrinal assertions 
- assertions that provide no useful framework for structuring the col-
lection of data. As the critique of methodology suggests, the lack of · 
such a framework means that data cannot even be perceived and as-
similated by the discourse, at least in any coherent fashion. Apart 
from this conceptual difficulty, the organizational structure of the 
courts impedes empirical analysis. Most judges' staffs are limited to 
three recent law school graduates and a legal secretary, their data base 
is limited to Lexis, and they write their opinions in a room lined with 
129. On the pervasive instrumentalism of American legal discourse, see R. SUMMERS, IN· 
STRUMENTALISM ANO AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); Summers, Pragmatic Instrumental-
ism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought -A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant 
General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981). 
130. This point is discussed at greater length in Rubin, Nazis, Skokie, and the First Amend· 
ment as Virtue (Book Review), 74 CALIF. L. REV. 233, 237-41 (1986). 
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legal reporters and some autographed pictures of the judges they 
themselves clerked for. Scholars make greater efforts to achieve em-
pirical clarity and obtain empirical data but once again, judicial dis-
course operates as a counterweight and a distraction. 
Apart from these effects on the prescriptions of legal scholars, the 
unity of discourse generates several subsidiary effects. One such effect 
is what Bruce Ackerman describes, in a more general context, as reac-
tivity.131 The agenda for the discipline is generally set by external 
events: a court or legislature acts, and a series of commentaries and 
criticisms quickly precipitate from the scholarly environment in re-
sponse to that action. Thus, a few cases in a row that lessen the effect 
of doctrine X will engender a law review article entitled "Is doctrine X 
dying a slow death?", while the promulgation of Statute Y or Regula-
tion Z will be followed by the ineluctable exegesis on "The New Stat-
ute Y (or Regulation Z): Does It Solve the Problem?" 
The events to which legal scholarship reacts should not be con-
fused with empirical data, which the field is reluctant to employ. 
What distinguishes data from events is that data is generated, defined 
and given significance by the academic discipline that studies it. 132 
Natural scientists generate their data by experiment or structured ob-
servation; 133 they then define its nature and extent by applying the 
conceptual structure of their discipline. Moreover, scientists deter-
mine the significance of the data they have thus generated and defined. 
It is the scientist who tells us whether a newly discovered dinosaur 
bone is just a piece of Cretaceous garbage that some local museum can 
131. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 72, at 24-28. "[T]he reactive constraint: No legal argu-
ment will be acceptable if it requires the lawyer to question the legitimacy of the military, eco· 
nomic, and social arrangements generated by the invisible hand." Id. at 25. Thus, Ackerman 
uses the term for a mode of legal discourse in which the political agenda is set by an external 
force. Here, the agenda·setting relates largely to topics; once the topic is chosen, contemporary 
legal scholars are no longer bound by the political reactivity that Ackerman describes in connec-
tion with lawyers, see id. at 28-37. See also R. KATZMAN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE 
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 27-35 (1979) (contrasting reactive and 
proactive styles of prosecution). 
132. This is a central claim of the critique of methodology. See note 46 supra (citing sources 
with respect to natural and social science); note 28 supra (citing sources with respect to social 
science). 
133. For a discussion of the role of experiment and observation in natural science, see I. 
HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING 149·275 (1983); K. POPPER, THE Lome OF SCI-
ENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959); Lakatos, supra note 51. Hacking goes further than Popper in this 
regard. He not only maintains that scientists often "create the phenomena which then become 
the centrepieces of theory," I: HACKING, supra at 220, but also suggests that the technological, or 
manipulative aspect of experimentation makes it independent of theory. This is an interesting 
claim, which Hacking concedes is inconsistent with much of modern philosophy in a sense that 
Popper's is not. But whether data is structured by a theoretical framework, as Popper and 
Lakatos believe, or by a technological process as Hacking maintains, it does not have autono-
mous force in either view. 
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display to visiting boy scout troops, or whether it changes our basic 
understanding of what dinosaurs were like. 134 Judicial decisions, on 
the other hand, are a discourse of their own; they generate themselves, 
structure themselves, and declare their own significance, quite apart 
from the efforts of legal scholars. Scholars can certainly affect these 
determinations of significance, and they can occasionally raise some 
mute, inglorious decision to epic proportions. But these are secondary 
influences; they may vary the prevailing pattern of significance some-
what, but the basic pattern is determined by the scholar's subject mat-
ter, not the scholar. 
This reactivity of standard legal scholarship, its perception that the 
world is filled with events, rather than data, is a product of the unity of 
discourse between judges and legal scholars. When the subject of the 
scholars' studies speaks the scholar's own language, when it defines its 
boundaries and declares its significance in the scholars' own terms, 
when it uses the same method of analysis, and, most of all, when it 
explicitly approves or rejects the scholars' works, scholars will be vir-
tually compelled to respond. The world of legal scholars is intensely 
alive with meaning, like the natural environment of neolithic tribes, 
where every mountain, tree, and river whispered messages to its 
inhabitants. 
Most other disciplines are nonreactive precisely because they do 
not possess this unity of discourse with their subject matter. A vol-
cano may be a dramatic historical event, but it does not rumble forth 
with an explicit refutation of Professor Magma's theory; it simply and 
inchoately explodes,_ leaving the Professor, his graduate students, and 
his academic rivals to determine whether clambering across its steam-
ing sides will be of any value. Literature and social behavior, being of 
human origin, are more closely related to their corresponding disci-
plines, but their discourse remains distinct. Novelists do not declare 
that they are initiating the hermeneutic circle, politicians do not wel-
come lobbyists with declarations of group theory, and criminals do not 
recruit accomplices with analyses of deviant behavior. At the very 
least, this compels scholars in these fields to develop their own stan-
dards for significance, and in most cases, it requires greater initiative 
in structuring a research agenda. Interestingly, when exceptions to the 
general pattern occur - when a politician adopts an economist's the-
ory, for example - the result is often to throw the economist into a 
reactive frenzy .135 
134. See, e.g .• HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 113-39; KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REV-
OLUTIONS supra note 8, at 10-90. 
135. See, e.g., R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 254-81 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) 
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Another characteristic of legal scholarship may be called its com-
partmentalized, or noncumulative structure. The ordinary article in 
many other disciplines begins with a catalogue of prior research on the 
subject in question. Within the first few paragraphs the author indi-
cates what issues this prior research has resolved, what problems re-
main, and how the present article will solve them. But the ordinary 
legal article begins with an account of an event, such as a judicial deci-
sion, a new statute, or an issue of public concern, and then presents a 
self-contained framework of analysis. The initial citations are gener-
ally designed to demonstrate that other scholars have not considered 
the issue, or have not adopted the proposed approach. The reason is 
that legal scholars must demonstrate that they are saying something 
new, but they are not required or expected to demonstrate the rela-
tionship between their article and prior scholarship, apart from the 
mere fact of novelty. 
Of course, legal scholarship is not completely static, nor do the 
individual articles exist in purely anchoritic isolation. General move-
ments of ideas can be discerned over the course of relatively long peri-
ods of time, and each article tends to rely on a shared background of 
legal concepts. But these trends and relationships are distinguished 
from the internal structure of a cumulative discipline by their general-
ity. The movement of ideas is a gradual evolution, rather than con-
scious development from one work to the next; the shared concepts on 
which scholarly works rely are broad characterizations of the field, 
rather than the specific conclusions of prior researchers. In other 
words, legal articles are linked to each other, and to their general 
background, in the same way that any identifiable set of human behav-
iors is so linked. But they do not display that higher degree of internal 
structure that characterizes many other academic fields, and that 
would be recognized as a cumulative tradition. 
The compartmentalization of legal scholarship, like its reactivity, 
appears to be a product of the unity of discourse. To begin with, reac-
tivity itself causes compartmentalization. Lacking a research agenda, 
legal scholars do not pursue sustained lines of inquiry, but engage in 
self-contained, dyadic colloquies with specific judicial decision-mak-
ers. More generally, the judicial discourse which scholars have 
adopted is essentially noncumulative. It does not build on prior deci-
(discussing John Maynard Keynes' involvement with government, including his book How TO 
PAY FOR THE WAR); id. at 181-88 (discussing Henry George, who went so far as to run for 
mayor of New York City twice); T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 222-99 (1984) (dis-
cussing Alfred E. Kahn's participation in deregulation efforts); D. ROBYN, BRAKING THE SPE-
CIAL INTERESI'S 57-91, 182-257 (1987) (discussing participation of Kahn and other economists 
in trucking deregulation). 
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sions, but revises or adopts those decisions as the current situation 
warrants. If the critique of methodology teaches us anything, it is that 
the process of cumulation is a way of thinking, and one that requires 
real commitment to, and concentration on, that very process. 136 Aca-
demic discourses have that commitment because it is central to their 
conception of validity, and to their belief that they are engaged in a 
collective enterprise, rather than a running argument. But for judges, 
the collective enterprise is governing the nation, and their sense of pro-
gress and achievement is derived from entirely different sources. If 
they are in control of the discourse, it will be designed for purposes 
quite distinct from cumulation. 
B. The Effectiveness of Legal Scholarship 
The characteristics of legal scholarship that are derived from its 
unity of discourse include a certain vagueness about the normative ba-
sis of scholarly prescriptions, a shortage of empirical grounding for 
those prescriptions, a reactivity to external events, and a compartmen-
talized, or noncumulative style. Undoubtedly there are others, includ-
ing some that do not sound quite so pejorative. What is significant 
about these particular characteristics, however, is their impact on the 
enterprise of legal scholarship, the self-defined goal of speaking per-
suasively to legal decision-makers. 
The most basic problem with the current mode of standard legal 
scholarship is that it is addressing a decision-maker that the modern 
state has demoted to a subordinate position. The discourse of the 
scholarship derives from, and relates to, the discourse of judges. But 
law these days is made predominantly by legislators and administra-
tive rule-makers, not by judges. Judges are important state officials, 
more important in the United States than most other nations, but 
many of the major decisions that shape our society and our law are 
legislative and administrative ones. In a number of crucial areas, the 
courts have been relegated to the secondary role of updating and gap-
filling, a role which steadily shrinks as the pace of legislative action 
increases, and as implementation becomes an increasingly administra-
tive task. 137 
The predominance of statutes and regulations places standard legal 
136. With respect to natural science, our most cumulative discipline, see KUHN, SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS, supra note 8, at 35-51 (validity claims based on paradigms, which act as a defini-
tional structure for puzzle-solving activity of normal science); R. RoRTY, supra note 19, at 315-
56; Lakatos, supra note 51. For an effort to assimilate Karl Popper, generally viewed as a de-
fender of positivism, to this position, see R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 61-71. 
137. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); J. 
HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 1-29 (1982). 
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scholarship in a difficult position, because it is ill-suited to address pol-
icy-oriented rule-makers. Its unity of discourse is a unity of discourse 
with the courts, not legislatures or administrative agencies. It relies on 
the sorts of arguments that courts deploy - arguments based on the 
coherence of legal doctrine, or the way that social policy can modify 
that doctrine. It translates its normative positions into judicial terms, 
thus obscuring their social policy implications, and strives for a finely 
wrought incrementalism that is irrelevant to the blunderbuss of 
legislation. 
To speak to a legislature or an agency, legal scholars must first 
identify the social policies which their recommendations seek to imple-
ment. They are unlikely to persuade a government decision-maker to 
adopt a specific policy, of course, but since these decision-makers 
think in policy terms, the scholar's recommendations will not seem 
relevant, or even comprehensible, unless they are articulated in those 
terms. Secondly, the recommendations must be supported by empiri-
cal data, not by doctrinal argument. Data provides the intellectual 
framework of legislative or administrative action, 138 just as doctrine 
provides the framework of judicial action. That does not mean that 
legislators always reach their decisions on the basis of data, any more 
-than judges reach their decisions on the basis of doctrine. What it 
does mean is that the discourse of legislative debate is heavily empiri-
cal as well as normative. To the extent that scholars can persuade 
policy-oriented decision-makers, they will do so only by presenting 
empirical arguments, connected to clearly stated normative 
positions. 139 
138. For example, data collection is one of the basic steps in standard policy analysis. See, 
e.g., G. EDWARDS & I. SHARKANSKY, THE POLICY PREDICAMENT: MAKING AND IMPLE-
MENTING PUBLIC POLICY 6-10 (1978). More informal approaches to administration also rely on 
data; they claim a relative advantage because their data requirements are less extensive, but data 
collection is central to their methodology as well. See E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION 
GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES LAW (1977); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR 154-71 (1955); Lindblom The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 79 (1959). 
139. The legislature's interest in data is a matter of serious debate at present. Some observers 
believe that legislators are genuinely concerned about acquiring the information necessary for 
responsible decision-making. See, e.g., R. FENNO, CoNGRESSMEN IN COMMfITEES (1973); W. 
MUIR, LEGISLATURE 105-37 (1982); Dechert, Availability of Information far Congressional Oper-
ations in CoNGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 154 (A. de Grazia ed. 1967); Mar-
vin, Evaluation for Congressional Committees: The Quest for Effective Procedures, in 
EVALUATION IN LEGISLATION 45-56 (F. Zweig ed. 1979); Melnick, Survey Research and Legis-
lative Assessment, in EDUCATING POLICYMAKERS FOR EVALUATION 146 (F. Zweig & K. Marvin 
eds. 1981). Other observers, notably those associated with the public choice movement, believe 
that legislators are exclusively concerned with maximizing their chances of re-election. See, e.g., 
J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); M. F!ORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THEW ASHINGTON 
EsTABLISHMENT (1977); M. HAYES, LoBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL 
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An equally serious, if more mundane, impediment arises from the 
reactivity of legal scholarship. Being reactive, legal scholarship tends 
to follow important events, rather than preceding them. This is not a 
serious disadvantage in addressing judges because judicial decision-
making is an incremental process. A case of first impression rarely 
resolves definitively the issue it addresses; more typically, it initiates a 
series of decisions in which the original decision is refined, revised or 
rejected. Reactions to this first decision, therefore, will be highly rele-
vant to the succeeding cases, and thus to the judicial efforts that deter-
mine the doctrine's evolution over time. But statutes and regulations 
establish law by means of a single large event, not an incremental se-
ries of smaller ones. By the time legal scholars have had a chance to 
react, the process is likely to be complete, and the scholars will be left, 
with the judiciary, to tidy up the remaining details. 140 
The compartmentalized nature of standard scholarship tends to 
make the timing problem still more serious. Because they are reac-
tions to external events, not elements of a cumulative scholarly tradi-
tion, legal articles possess all the interest of last year's newspaper once 
the particular event has passed. When the next issue arises, none of 
the prior commentary seems particularly relevant. It is hard even to 
imagine anyone but a legal historian reading scholarly analyses of 
fifty-year-old statutes.141 Certainly, legislatures will not do so; the is-
sues that impel them to act are likely to have arisen last year, or last 
MARKETS (1981); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); M. OLSON, 
THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971). 
140. One example is the standard legal scholarship dealing with payments law, a branch of 
commercial law. In the 1940s, the American Law Institute, under the direction of Karl Llewel· 
lyn, began a comprehensive codification of commercial law, including a revision of the uniform 
law regarding negotiable instruments. No commentary on this project appeared until the late 
1940s, when a few student notes and a few articles by the drafters were published. Leary, Some 
Clarification in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 97 
U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1949); Note, Bank Credit as Values: The Commercial Code Article Ill, 57 
YALE L.J. 1419 (1948). Extensive critical commentary did not begin until the statute had been 
promulgated. Similarly, there was very little discussion of electronic funds transfers by academ-
ics until legislative efforts were initiated in 1974. Once that occurred, there was a virtual explo· 
sion of academic interest, but most of this came too late to affect the legislative effort. See, e.g., 
Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 25 U. CATH. L. REV. 687 (1976); Electronic Funds Transfers, 
35 Mo. L. REv. 3 (1975); A Primer on Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 37 U. P1rr. L. REV. 
613 (1976); EFT Symposium, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 225 (1979); Computers in Law and Society: 
Government Regulation of the Computer Industry, Electronic Funds Transfers, 1977 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 499. 
141. In the area of payments law, for example, the leading articles which critiqued 
superceded statutes are virtually never cited despite the contemporary attention they received, 
and the prestige of their authors. See, e.g., Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L. 
REv. 241 (1900); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Bank Collections Act and Possibility of Recodifi· 
cation of the Law on Negotiable Instruments, 9 TUL. L. REv. 378 (1935); Brannan, Some Neces-
sary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments Law (pts. 1 & 2), 26 HARV. L. REV. 493, 588 
(1913); Townsend, The Bank Collectlon Code of the American Bankers' Association (pts. 1-3), 8 
TUL. L. REV. 21, 236, 376 (1933-34). 
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month, and to display little apparent connection to those that evoked 
scholarly discussion in the past. However classic the original analyses 
were in their time, they will be forgotten because they were reactive 
and compartmentalized, and.thus lacked a framework on which subse-
quent scholarship could build. 
If standard legal scholarship seems ill-adapted to addressing legis-
latures and administrative rule-makers in a persuasive manner, one 
would imagine that it would be ideal for addressing judges. It is with 
judges, after all, that legal scholars share their discourse, and it is to 
them that the large majority of scholarly efforts are explicitly directed. 
The difficulty is that the fit is all too good. Do judges really need to be 
told how to interpret prior cases, or how to construct a legal argu-
ment? That is the very essence of their job, after all, and most people 
tend to believe that they can do their job reasonably well on their own. 
Of course, scholars can acquire a reputation that allows them to speak 
as authorities, or articulate an argument that possesses a persuasive 
power of its own. And judges are quite willing to cite scholarly arti-
cles in support of positions they have already decided to adopt. But 
since the general discourse of scholarship is so similar to the judge's, 
the general impression will be that there is nothing particularly dis-
tinctive about the scholar's contribution. 
There are areas where judges clearly need assistance, but they do 
not involve doctrinal reasoning. The modified formalism of the pres-
ent era has changed judicial reasoning from doctrinal analysis to a 
more broad ranging consideration of how legal doctrine and social pol-
icy interact. 142 While the doctrine itself is familiar to judges, the pro-
cess of modifying it requires them to enter new and unfamiliar 
territory, for which they are concededly ill-prepared. Scholarship that 
spoke to them about these matters would provide much-needed nor-
mative clarification and empirical information. 
To begin with, modern judges regularly invoke social policy, but 
they possess no general framework for determining the content of that 
policy, or the way that it should interact with doctrinal argument. 
While this lack of clarity permits policy to be used as a kind of deus ex 
machina, whose sudden appearance produces the desired result, it also 
generates a sense of discomfort among conscientious judicial decision-
makers.143 Because they must decide cases one at a time, however, 
most judges cannot articulate a comprehensive policy approach in ad-
142 . .See note 76 supra (citing sources). 
143. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1 
(1986); Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional 
Values, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200 (1984). 
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vance of their decisions, nor can they trace the normative implications 
of the policy that they articulate in each decided case. Only legal 
scholarship is likely to produce a sustained elaboration of social policy 
approaches, and an exploration of their interaction with existing 
doctrine. 
In addition, judges are increasingly concerned with the empirical 
basis and the real world effects of their decisions.144 But they have no 
systematic way to gather data, or to measure those effects. The princi-
pal sources of data that are available to a judge are the facts of the 
specific case, which must be discerned from amidst the shouted claims 
of the plaintiff and defendant, and the facts of the reported cases, 
which some prior judge discerned from similarly tendentious argu-
ments.145 The principal means of determining the effects of a decision 
is to receive a petition from one side to enforce or modify its terms. 
Judges generally cannot commission research on alternative solutions, 
they cannot conduct experiments concerning their preliminary 
choices, and they cannot evaluate the impact of their ultimate conclu-
sions.146 Given the current structure of our judicial system, empirical 
information of this kind will not be available unless it has appeared in 
published scholarship. 
But the characteristics of standard legal scholarship preclude it 
from providing judges with these needed forms of normative and em-
pirical assistance. Its unity of discourse produces generalized advice 
on how the case should be decided, unanchored in either articulated 
social policy or empirical research. The reactivity of the scholarship 
tends to generate articles that argue with the court's reasoning in the 
same speculative and delimited terms the court itself employs, rather 
than constituting an independent research program. The scholarship's 
compartmentalization precludes either comprehensive social policy 
analysis or sustained empirical research, since both require efforts that 
exceed the limits of a single book or article. Scholarship of this nature 
is ultimately too dependent on the judicial process to have much influ-
144. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); J. MONAHAN & L. 
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1985); M. SAKS & R. VAN DU· 
IZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION (1983); Davis, "There is a Book Out 
••• ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987). 
145. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of lnfor· 
motion to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975). 
146. See, e.g., Davis, Judicial. Legislative and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Re· 
search Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1986); Newman, Rethinking Fairness: 
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643 (1985). For efforts to do so, see, e.g., D. 
HOROWITZ, supra note 144; c. JOHNSON & B. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPACT (1984); Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual 
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
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ence on it. What judges need is not an iteration of their own ap-
proach, but assistance in those areas where the demands of that 
approach have outrun their institutional and conceptual resources. 
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR STANDARD SCHOLARSHIP 
If the somewhat shop-worn discourse that legal scholars have bor-
rowed from the judiciary is inadequate for the enterprise in which they 
are engaged, a new discourse should be developed. Such a discourse is 
presented below, but not as a pure proposal; rather, it is both a propo-
sal for standard legal scholarship, and a means of continuing the de-
scription of that scholarship. As stated, description and critique are 
symbiotic processes, which cannot proceed without each other. The 
proposal for a new type of discourse, therefore, is also a description of 
certain trends within the existing discourse. The point, then, is to 
identify and clarify those trends, not to imagine a completely different 
style of scholarship. 
Such an approach is necessary for any descriptive and prescriptive 
analysis of scholarship, at least according to the critique of methodol-
ogy. No major academic field is monolithic and unchanging; they all 
contain innumerable contradictions, cross-currents, emerging trends 
and decaying traditions. This renders any static characterization of 
the field incomplete, and demands some effort to identify its dynamic 
features, especially those features that seem to display systematic ten-
dencies for future change. 
The converse is that proposals cannot be effective unless they are 
related to existing trends and tendencies. It is impossible to stand on 
an Archimedian point and to effect the total, sudden transformation of 
a scholarly tradition. Rather, change is likely to be incremental. 
Moreover, in the absence of a major social dislocation, it is most likely 
to be generated by forces within the tradition itself, through the pro-
cess of collective self-awareness. The best way to facilitate this process 
is by identifying and articulating an existing trend, so it becomes more 
clearly present to the minds of those who have created it. This is 
likely to amplify the trend, and ultimately increase the chance that it 
will become a significant or dominant feature of the scholarship. 
A. The Basis of a New Discourse 
The critique of methodology's negative element provides the basis 
for its affirmative possibilities. This negative element - the attack on 
positivism - suggests that we abandon the quest for objective reality 
and definite, unchanging truth, particularly in the human sciences. In-
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stead we are required to accept the vision of academic disciplines as 
practices that generate validity claims on the basis of culturally deter-
mined judgments. This represents something of a defeat, because ob-
jective truth possesses an undeniable appeal. But in return we acquire 
a certain collective power over the discourse of our disciplines. We 
become aware that these disciplines construct our vision of reality, and 
in doing so, project a system of cultural beliefs that give meaning and 
order to the subjects that they study. Thus, the rules are no longer 
dictated to us by external, impersonal verities. We take control, and 
gain the power to transform our own conceptions of validity, however 
gradually and painfully, through a process of collective self awareness. 
As previously stated, 147 legal scholarship long ago abandoned the 
formalist ideology that it was discovering objectively true law. This 
occurred through a process of critique that paralleled the critique of 
methodology's attack on positivism. In place of formalism, it devel-
oped a normatively-based discourse of the sort that the critique of 
methodology would recommend. But that discourse lacks the quality 
of self-awareness that lies at the center of the critique's affirmative vi-
sion. Instead of acknowledging and elaborating its normative basis, 
the scholarship has masked it with the vague and diffuse norms of 
judicial discourse. This disables legal scholarship from achieving the 
purposes that its own, normatively-based vision has generated. 
The greatest impediment in developing a new discourse would ap-
pear to be the absence of a unified theory of law. It has long been clear 
to legal scholars that the hazy neo-formalism of the judiciary is an 
unsatisfactory basis for normatively-based analysis. The most obvious 
solution is to clarify the analysis by identifying the norms that serve as 
the basis of prescription. But doing so would seem to require norma-
tive agreement, and such agreement is obviously lacking. The essen-
tial nature of the field is an ongoing debate among competing norms. 
Approaches based upon these norms - critical legal studies, law and 
economics, progressive liberalism, and a variety of others - are each 
presented and elaborated by their proponents in an effort to achieve 
consensus, to persuade those with opposite perspectives. But there is 
no consensus, and it seems unlikely that there ever will be one. 148 
Self-awareness cannot supply a particular consensus; what it does 
supply is a recognition of the legal scholarship's normative conflict as 
such, and a validation of this conflict as a practice. By becoming 
aware of the inherently normative nature of the field, scholars can ac-
147. See text at notes 58-69 supra. 
148. See Brest, supra note 45. 
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knowledge that there is no consensus, and that lack of consensus itself 
provides the unified vision that defines the practice. In other words, 
the conflict of norms is the essence of normatively-based scholarship; 
this conflict constitutes its meaning, and establishes its significance. 
The entire point of standard legal scholarship is to explore and con-
trast the pragmatic implications of conflicting normative positions. 
Normative agreement, therefore, would not provide a basis for legal 
scholarship; rather, it would extinguish the field as we know it, and 
substitute a bland expanse of detail. The fact that such agreement can-
not be achieved thus validates the enterprise itself. 
Normative conflict not only constitutes the discourse of legal 
scholarship, but also reflects the field's subject matter. Law, after all, 
is the mechanism through which society restructures itself, or at least 
restructures those elements of itself that are subject to collective con-
trol. In an open, pluralistic society such as our own, that process in-
volves the contest of differing views, not simply as a result of grim 
necessity, but as a matter of affirmative belief. We believe that the best 
way for a society to restructure itself is through an ongoing debate 
about its goals and strategies. To be relevant to that debate, legal 
scholarship must advocate and critique all the positions represented 
within it. If legal scholars, as a group, were to align themselves with 
one position, they would not only be overlooking important elements 
of the political process, but would be excluding themselves from the 
very essence of that process which is its contest of opposing views. 
The most promising discourse for standard legal scholarship, 
therefore, is not the vaguely articulated neo-formalism of the courts, 
but prescriptive arguments based on consciously acknowledged nor-
mative positions. This would emphasize conflict, rather than its reso-
lution, but it is in such conflict, properly defined and channelled, that 
the meaning of the practice lies. The collective self-awareness that 
would generate such an approach operates at two levels. First, it en-
ables scholars to perceive the normative grounding of their own indi-
vidual positions, and to express that grounding with increased clarity. 
Second, it provides them with a general vision of the field, and an 
understanding of ongoing, ever-evolving normative interplay that 
characterizes it. 
There is certainly no shortage of normative positions in existing 
legal literature; in fact, the tendency to identify and rely on such posi-
tions has become increasingly prominent in recent years. Law and 
economics rests on the belief that the purpose of the law is to increase 
aggregate wealth or to maximize the efficiency of legal mechanisms. 
Critical legal studies rests on the belief that law should be an instru-
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ment for the relatively rapid transformation of society in the direction 
of social equality, and the growth of community. Other approaches 
are less clearly identified, but probably would be more congenial to 
most legal scholars. Liberalism, now almost an imprecation, but 
nonetheless our dominant political philosophy, generally treats law as 
a means of securing individual liberty; its progressive version asserts 
that economic well-being is an essential element of such liberty, to be 
balanced against freedom from state control. As Donald Gjerdingen 
points out, there is an emerging body of scholarship that adopts pro-
gressive liberalism as its normative basis.149 More specific normative 
choices attach an independent value to natural environments, to fami-
lies, or to legal institutions. And one can champion the coherence of 
the law itself, as Ronald Dworkin does, thus adopting modified for-
malism as a consciously recognized norm. 150 
Recognition of these different normative positions within the 
corpus of legal scholarship does not imply that individual scholars 
should assume an agnostic, bloodless attitude toward their own work. 
On the contrary, normatively-based scholarship makes sense only if 
the scholars believe in what they recommend, if they engage in what 
George Fletcher calls committed argument. 151 The fact that validity 
is ultimately determined through an ongoing contest among alterna-
tive views, rather than definitive discovery of objective truth, results 
from the field's basic character as a practice, not from any unfortunate 
loss of a unified value system. By becoming aware that validity is de-
termined in this way, scholars should be able to commit themselves 
more fully to their normative positions. The continuing existence of 
the debate among alternative norms, and the maintenance of its con-
flicting strands, gives legal scholarship its meaning; if it ended, the 
field would be as desiccated and pointless as it would be if no one 
believed in his or her own arguments. Consequently, scholars can rec-
ognize the character of their enterprise as a debate among competing 
norms, while at the same time remaining fully aware of and committed 
to the particular norms that they have chosen. 
The risk inherent in clear, self-conscious norm definition is not that 
scholars will stop believing in those norms, but rather that they will 
149. Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 422-67. To some extent, Gjerdingen treats the scholarship 
based on this norm as equivalent to the more general rejection of formalism. As he points out, 
however, scholarship based on other normative premises, such as critical legal studies, incorpo-
rates most of the same methodological elements. In addition, progressive liberalism can certainly 
make use of other methodologies, such as law and economics. 
150. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 66, at 151-275. For a more delimited endorsement of 
doctrinal coherence, see Fiss, supra note 65. 
151. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981). 
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stop believing in the practice of legal scholarship. In other words, the 
practice might be held together by its ambiguities, and increased clar-
ity might only cause its different subgroups to drift off in opposite di-
rections. But this danger is counteracted by the subject matter of the 
scholarship. Law involves the organization of society itself; because 
we have an open, pluralist culture, the way we organize our society 
will always be subject to normative debate. Such debate comes natu-
rally to us, and is as likely to be integrative as divisive. A scholarly 
field that deals directly with the themes of this debate will tend to be 
equally unfazed by its continuation. In fact, the clash of normative 
positions within the scholarship, since it accurately reflects the field's 
subject matter, may well produce its own sort of coherence. 
B. The Nature of the Discourse 
This view of legal scholarship can serve as the ground for a new 
discourse, one that is separate from the discourse of the judiciary. Its 
first element is the organization of scholarly efforts around clearly 
stated normative positions. These norms serve as starting points; they 
can themselves be argued for, of course, but then the basis of those 
arguments must be stated as well. Once a normative position is identi-
fied, a variety of arguments can be grounded on it. These would 
include purely legal arguments about doctrine or statutory interpreta-
tion, but the discourse of those legal arguments would differ from judi-
cial discourse because they begin from a norm, not a judicial decision 
or the preexisting body of decided law. When judges decide cases by 
referring to prior cases, they do not state the rationale for doing so; 
they do not need to, since the rationale comes with the robe. But legal 
scholarship will only be effective if its arguments, including its legal 
coherence arguments, are based on clearly stated rationales. 
To constitute legal scholarship, the normative positions of the 
scholar must be translated into legal terms. They must be located in 
the existing body of law, and explain their points of contact and their 
points of difference with it. This seems obvious - in fact, legal schol-
arship currently suffers from an excess of legal language and contextu-
alization, rather than the lack of it. What must be recognized, 
however, is that the legal language is being used as a means of commu-
nicating with legal decision-makers, not as a conceptual framework. 
The framework comes from the scholarship itself, and must be devel-
oped in terms of the scholar's normative position. 
The second element of the scholarly discourse which the critique of 
methodology suggests is the conscious deployment of doctrinal and 
empirical arguments for the elaboration of the scholar's normative 
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premises. Doctrinal arguments are already part of legal scholarship, 
to say the least. The contribution that the critique provides is to in-
crease the scholar's awareness of these arguments as particular discur-
sive strategies. They implement norms, rather then demonstrating or 
containing them. By viewing doctrinal arguments in this way, schol-
ars can assess the relative value of translating their normative premises 
into existing doctrine, as opposed to displacing that doctrine through 
legislative or administrative means. 
Secondly, self-awareness allows legal scholars to make more exten-
sive, but more controlled use of empirical data. Data is generally 
structured by a methodology, that is, a set of rules that determine 
whether the data support the validity of a particular hypothesis. 
Although legal scholarship has abandoned its own claims to objectiv-
ity, it often makes the positivist assumption that social science meth-
odologies, like economic analysis or sociological surveys, have some 
autonomous existence, rather than being techniques that are used to 
support normative or other preempirical judgments in a variety of 
fields. As a result, there is a tendency to perceive these methodologies, 
and the data they would generate, as foreign to the practice of legal 
scholarship. In discussing the effects of a judicial decision, for exam-
ple, legal scholars tend to opt for speculations that are structured by 
their own legal discourse, rather than searching for a methodology 
that can be used to determine these effects on empirical grounds. 
When legal scholars do make use of data, they often assume, on 
similarly positivist grounds, that particular empirical methodologies 
necessarily lead in predictable directions, rather than providing means 
of arguing for a variety of normative positions. Economic analysis, for 
example, is often seen as being linked to a norm of wealth maximiza-
tion, 152 while textual deconstruction becomes the servant of social 
transformation norms. 153 But those who champion wealth maximiza-
tion need not, and often should not, limit their analysis to economics. 
For example, economists have been arguing for years that usury laws 
are inefficient, in part because they restrict the supply of credit to the 
very people they are intended to protect.154 The point can be taken as 
152. This is true for both those who favor the norm and those who oppose it. See, e.g., 
Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to 
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977); Kennedy, supra note 20; Posner, Utilitarianism, Eco· 
nomics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). 
153. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 84; Singer, supra note 83; Spann, Deconstructing the Legis· 
lative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1984); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional 
Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984). For the argument that decon· 
struction does not imply a particular political position, see Balkin, supra note 103. 
154. See, e.g., Crafton, An Empirical Test of the Effects of Usury Laws, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 135 
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established, yet the laws persist. Clearly, the argument could be ad-
vanced at this point by a political analysis, which explored the ways to 
decrease the staying power of these laws. Conversely, microeconomics 
can readily serve to undercut existing power structures and wealth dis-
tribution patterns. The consumer movement arose out of an informal 
analysis of market failure that could readily be developed along more 
systematic lines. 155 
In general, increased self-awareness could be expected to increase 
the ability of legal scholars to employ a wider variety of methodolo-
gies, and thus to collect and apply empirical data that is now reflex-
ively regarded as irrelevant. The critique of methodology would 
recommend this approach, as an element of scholarly self-awareness. 
As previously noted, the critique does not suggest that existing meth-
odologies should be abandoned, but that we become more conscious of 
them, so that we can use them more effectively, and choose among 
them with more freedom. 
This conscious control of methodology distinguishes the approach 
suggested here from the law and economics movement. Rather than 
beginning from a norm and employing a range of methodologies, law 
and economics scholars begin from a methodology, and sometimes 
claim that it generates the norm. In fact, these scholars generally have 
a preexisting normative premise, but they often try to hide it, and then 
treat that norm as a conclusion that can be derived by means of meth-
odology.156 The critique of methodology suggests that we think in 
terms of a normatively-based economic efficiency or wealth maximiza-
tion movement, rather than a law and economics movement. In doing 
so, of course, proponents of this movement would be abandoning the 
effort to prove that their normative premises are the only justifiable 
basis for legal prescriptions, and also abandoning their aspiration to 
monopolize economic analysis. The recompense, however, is the abil-
ity to make use of other methodologies in the elaboration of their 
norms, and to jettison their claim to objectivity that alienates their 
(1980); High, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas -A Rejoinder by an Economist, 50 TEXAS 
L. REV. 463 (1972); Shay, The Impact of State Legal Rate Ceilings Upon Availability and Price of 
Credit, in AN EcONOMETRlC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (D. Greer & R. Shay eds.) 387 (The National Commission on Consumer Finance, Tech-
nical Studies, vol. 4 1974). 
155. For some of the leading work that initiated the modern consumer movement, see, e.g., 
D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963) (information asymmetry, small scale monopoly); 
J. MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH (1963) (same); R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY 
SPEED (1965) (information asymmetry). 
156. The classic text, along these lines, is R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 
1986). See also Posner, supra note 153; Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 61 
B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987). 
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sympathizers157 and fools no one at all. 158 
A discourse which begins from normative premises, and proceeds 
by empirical data as well as legal analysis, might be regarded as view-
ing the legal system from an external perspective, or as relying on the 
incorporation of other disciplines into legal scholarship.159 With re-
spect to normative premises, however, the critique of methodology 
suggests a different perspective, although largely by analogy. The cri-
tique's attack on p~sitivism emphasizes that all natural and social sci-
ences are grounded in the preempirical linguistic structures, cultural 
attitudes and individual perceptions of their human originatorf). 160 
While these preempirical phenomena do not belong to science but un-
derlie it, their existence does not deprive the natural or social sciences 
of their integrity as academic disciplines. Rather, they make these dis-
ciplines possible.161 Similarly, the normative positions on which legal 
scholarship depends are the prelegal groundings that make possible 
such scholarship. While these normative positions are generally con-
sidered "political," not legal, they are the necessary starting point for 
any legal analysis, and thus do not reflect a dilution of the field's legal 
character. 
Nor should the more empirical manner in which the analysis is 
elaborated be regarded as an abandonment of law to other disciplines. 
Economics, sociology, political science and all the other empirical dis-
ciplines that have been appended to the dangling conjunction of "law 
and" can support legal analysis, but legal scholarship must supply the 
organizing principles. It must generate its own problems, establish its 
own categories, identify its own audience, and develop its own validity 
157. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 20; Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective 
Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974). 
158. The nonnative basis of economic analysis has been clearly noted by those who use its 
methodology, see Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOF· 
srRA L. REv. 591 (1980); Polinsky, supra note 157; those who seem neutral about it, sec Cass, 
Coping with Life, Law and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 
67 B.U. L. REV. 73 (1987); Leff, supra note 20; and those who reject it, sec Kennedy, supra note 
20; Kelman, supra note 20. 
159. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 761 (1987). 
160. See note 29 supra. 
161. It must be emphasized that none of the thinkers identified here as participating in the 
critique of methodology were idealists. See note 33. All of them, including Heidegger, conceded 
that natural science, and even social science, are coherent disciplines capable of telling us inter· 
esting and useful things about the world. Their claim is that they cannot tell us everything about 
the world and, in particular, they cannot explain their own assumptions. Sec, e.g., HABERMAS, 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13, at 113-39; HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, supra note 9, at 71-76, 
244-56; HEIDEGGER, Modem Science, supra note 9; HUSSERL, EUROPEAN SCIENCES, supra note 
2, at 103-32; 1 A. SCHUTZ, PAPERS supra note 3, at 34-47; Taylor, supra note 27; Winch, supra 
note 6. See also FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 14, at 71-76 (usefulness of human sci-
ence not explicitly conceded). 
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claims. There are both pragmatic and theoretical reasons for this. 
Pragmatically, legal scholars are not trained to be social scientists and 
do not have the necessary resources available to them in their institu-
tional setting.162 Both personally and institutionally, they can much 
more readily apply empirical data to legal problems, once the data is 
developed. In terms of theory, an independent legal discourse is a pre-
requisite for effective interdisciplinary efforts. Before legal scholars 
make use of insights from other disciplines, they must possess princi-
ples of selection and adaptation, principles that can only be supplied 
by their own academic practice. In the absence of such principles, 
standard scholarship would either limit its use of other disciplines to 
scattered citations, 163 or give itself over to those disciplines in a way 
that precludes its basic project of addressing legal decision-makers. 
With such principles in place, interdisciplinary work, of the sort that is 
becoming increasingly common in legal scholarship, creates no real 
possibility that the discourse of legal scholarship will become nonlegal. 
But the critique of methodology suggests another, somewhat 
deeper sense in which law exists as an independent discipline. For the 
field's involvement with empirical data, and even its reliance on. nor-
mative presuppositions, to be regarded as a loss of independence, one 
must assume that influence is flowing in one particular direction -
from other fields toward law. In fact, it often flows the other way. 
While legal analysis begins from nonlegal normative premises, the 
elaboration of their. implications, through legal analysis, can have an 
effect upon those premises. Over time, the pragmatic operation of our 
legal system alters our deepest social norms. The relationship is an 
interactive one, and the direction of significant effects is not necessarily 
the same as the internal organization of individual scholarly works. 
Similarly, law has a powerful effect on empirical disciplines. One 
cannot assume from the mere admixture of these fields that legal 
scholarship is a passive recipient of methodology and wisdom. It is 
the law, after all, that determines how we employ the knowledge gen-
erated by other disciplines. Law determines whether businesses use 
race to determine creditworthiness, 164 or test-taking ability to deter-
162. Friedman, supra note 45, at 774; Posner, supra note 81, at 1121-22. In terms of re-. 
sources, legal scholars generally do not have students who are writing dissertations, their teach-
ing assignments typically involve discussions of doctrine, not empirical investigation, and they 
have less access to funding sources to support such investigation. 
163. See text at notes 34-36 supra. Without a methodology, fact gathering becomes a 
mechanical or incoherent process that has little intellectual appeal. The most notorious case of 
brute fact gathering is the work of Underhill Moore. See, e.g., Moore & Sussman, supra note 60; 
Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, supra note 60. See generally Schlegel, Underhill Moore, supra note 
60. 
164. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982) prohibits the use of race, or 
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mine job eligibility, 165 no matter what social scientists claim about the 
predictive value of these measures. It determines the conclusions that 
we draw from evolution or from economics, how we use the tech-
niques that they develop, and whether we will invest social resources 
in the further development of those techniques. The law will decide 
whether we will find out what happens when sexual psychopaths re-
ceive shock therapy, or what effects man-made microbes have when 
they are sprayed on broccoli. The normative debates of standard legal 
scholarship, therefore, are more than an application of the critique of 
methodology. They are the critique itself, the very process of collec-
tive moral inquiry that it urges society to institute. When law adopts 
the perspectives or methodologies of another discipline, therefore, it is 
not simply attaching itself to a superior and predetermined system. It 
is evaluating that system, testing its techniques to see whether they are 
socially acceptable or relevant. In the final analysis, the future of the 
empirical disciplines will be determined by such preempirical norma-
tive determinations, perhaps more decisively than it is determined by 
the validity claims that these disciplines generate within their 
discourses. 
C. The Effectiveness of the Discourse 
A legal discourse that begins from normative premises and is elab-
orated through consciously deployed empirical and doctrinal argu-
ment is likely to be more effective in achieving the self-defined goal of 
legal scholars, that is, to speak to public decision-makers in a persua-
sive manner. For legislators and administrative rulemakers, a dis-
course of this nature would be directly relevant, at least to the extent 
that they are engaged in the pursuit of public policy. Public policy, 
after all, is the application of normative choices to the practical 
problems of government, and elaboration of normative premises 
through legal analysis and empirical data is precisely such a process. 
Legislative and administrative decision-makers need to know how to 
express their policies in legal terms, and to integrate them into the 
remaining legal context that they have no desire to disrupt. They also 
proxies for race (such as home zip code) as criteria for creditworthiness determinations. These 
factors, as developed and measured by the social science of statistical analysis, have high predic· 
tive value, but we have made a normative decision that they may not be used. 
165. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), prohibits discrimi-
nation in employment. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court 
held unanimously that professionally prepared aptitude tests could not be used when they have 
discriminatory effects. The predictive value of these tests is open to question, see, e.g., S. GOULD, 
THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981), but the decision indicates that they will be judged in terms of 
legally operative norms, whatever social scientists say about their quality. 
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need to know the pragmatic choices for implementing these policies, 
and the real world effects of each choice on both the legal system and 
the world at large. 166 Of course legislators and administrators also act 
on the basis of strategic considerations unrelated to their sense of pub-
lic policy. Scholars can describe this behavior, but that is generally 
not the mission that legal academics identify for themselves. Rather 
they take a prescriptive stance, which is necessarily addressed to some 
particular decision-maker. To the extent that they do so, it is the pub-
lic policy-oriented behavior of that decision-maker to which the 
scholar is appealing. 
The fit is less precise for judicial decision-makers, but it remains 
superior to the unity of discourse of existing scholarship. It is true 
that judges tend to begin their analysis from authoritative legal texts, 
rather than independently articulated normative premises. But the 
difficult part of their role is the modification of textually derived doc-
trine, not the application of that doctrine. Scholarship based on 
clearly stated, normative premises speaks directly to the process of 
modification. It provides arguments and data in those areas where 
judges will be receptive to scholarly recommendations, rather than re-
citing the analysis that judges can carry out perfectly well - at least in 
their view - by themselves. 
Moreover, judicial decision-makers themselves may be developing 
a style that relies on identified normative positions and empirical elab-
oration. Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick perceive such a develop-
ment in the movement from "autonomous" to "responsive" law.167 In 
their view, responsive law represents "a decline of artificial reason, a 
convergence of legal and policy analysis" 168 as judges replace their 
ideal of impartial fairness with principles for analyzing the "character-
istic institutional problems that are associated with carrying out differ-
ent kinds of mandates."169 To the extent that this process occurs, the 
fit between normatively-based legal scholarship and judicial decision-
making would become much closer. 
The value of normative clarity, however, does not depend on the 
166. Of course, this is an ideal, probably one that cannot be approached in most circum-
stances. However, less optimistic accounts of the policy process move in the same direction. See 
H. SIMON, supra note 138; J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958) (limits on number of 
options and amount of available information, leading to "satisficing" or finding merely satisfac-
tory alternatives rather than optimal ones); Lindblom, supra note 138 (norms and information 
usable only for incremental decisionmaking). 
167. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSffiON (1978). 
168. Id. at 110. 
169. Id. at 111. Nonet and Selznick describe this process as a movement from "fairness to 
competence." Id. at 104-13. They see the evolving, although not necessarily inevitable concept 
of law as less formal, more purposive and more interdisciplinary. 
1902 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86: 1835 
willingness of public decision-makers to begin from normative prem-
ises themselves, either when initially formulating policy, or as a means 
of modifying doctrine. Public decision-makers often muddle through, 
acting by an intuitive process in which policies are chosen on the basis 
of their real world elaborations.17° They may genuinely not know 
whether they favor economic efficiency or social equity, because those 
choices are too abstract for their decision-making framework. Instead, 
they may prefer to choose among elaborations, to evaluate policy on 
the basis of its effect upon small towns, or consumers, or legal doc-
trine. One can always regard these views as norms of their own, but it 
is usually impossible to construct a normative system from them. 
They are intuitions or emotional reactions, and while it is easy to be 
scornful of their logic, it would be unwise to dismiss their practical 
significance. 
To the extent tnat these choices are nonstrategic - and they often 
are - normatively-based legal scholarship is fully relevant to them as 
well. We often choose our norms on the basis of their implications; in 
fact, a large part of the debate about public policy consists of compar-
ing the elaborated versions of those policies, in an intuitive or emotive 
framework. Legal scholarship that develops these elaborations also 
speaks directly to this decision-making context. It cannot exercise di-
rect control of our collective intuition, but it can explain the nature 
arid limits of the choices that are based upon those intuitions. Once 
we see what economic efficiency, for example, means for consumers or 
the environment, we may be in a better position to decide whether we 
want it or not. If we decide that we do not, particularly if we once 
thought we did, that decision is likely to generate a process of defining 
new norms, with different implications. Normatively-based legal 
scholarship can participate in this process of evaluating and redefining 
basic policy choices. It is here that the concept of law as practical 
judgment plays a role, by suggesting that legal decision-makers can 
make use of the conclusions reached by legal scholars without retrac-
ing the more systematic steps by which these conclusions were 
reached. Without clearly stated premises, however, the scholarship 
simply swirls around in the intuitionist melange. It fails to fulfill its 
unique role in demonstrating how practical effects are linked to policy 
choices, how those effects relate to each other, or how general policies 
can be constructed from them. 
The articulation of norms, and their legal and empirical elabora-
tion, also serves to control the dysfunctional aspects of legal scholar-
170. Lindblom, supra note 138, Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason, supra note 122, at 1643-
47. 
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ship that have resulted from the unity of discourse. To begin with, 
this approach is likely to reduce the compartmentalization of legal 
scholarship. Once the underlying assumptions of scholarly works are 
explicitly stated, and once that process has continued long enough for 
a reasonably consistent vocabulary to emerge, analysis stemming from 
each major type of normative assumption will tend to constitute a cu-
mulative tradition. This is not the universal cumulation of the sort 
that occurs in natural science, but rather the sort of divided cumula-
tion along parallel paths that characterizes social science. Both law 
and economics and critical legal studies, being the most conscious of 
their normative basis, already exhibit a certain tendency toward cumu-
lation. For normative systems that lie closer to mainstream liberal 
thought, the effect has been considerably weaker, presumably because 
the norms in question are so easily relied upon without explicit 
articulation. 
The explicit statement of normative assumptions would also facili-
tate cumulation in a manner more directly linked to the cumulation of 
the natural sciences. As stated above, normative premises provide a 
means of organizing empirical data. They do not dictate a specific 
methodology, but they establish criteria by which methodologies can 
be selected. Given such an organizing principle, data collection is an 
inherently cumulative activity. The normative premise provides a set 
of issues to be resolved or hypotheses to be proved, and the methodol-
ogies employed supply a standard for verification or falsification by 
empirical evidence. In effect, the premise and its attendant methodol-
ogies becomes a means of structuring the world, and interpreting its 
otherwise aleatory phenomena. The data generally will not cumulate 
across normative boundaries, in the manner that natural science data 
developed in one field can be adopted by another, but within a given 
boundary, the enterprise will generally progress. 
A normatively explicit approach to standard legal scholarship 
would also entail a major decrease in the field's reactivity. The charac-
teristic most immediately derived from the unity of discourse between 
judges and scholars, reactivity means that judges, and to a lesser ex-
tent legislators, establish the agenda for academic investigation. But a 
scholarship which explores the implications of specified normative as-
sumptions through consciously selected methodologies will necessarily 
set its own agenda. It will define a set of issues, and specify the legal 
analyses and empirical data that will confirm or disconfirm its hypoth-
eses about those issues, rather than lying in wait for events that allow 
the theory's further elaboration. Thus a norm provides a way of struc-
turing reality, and can be elaborated by observations or analyses that 
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are structured by the norm itself. Hence, it generates a research pro-
gram that speaks directly to the concerns of legislators and adminis-
trators, while providing judges with needed perspectives and 
information for modifying legal doctrine. 
Of course, the reactive quality of legal scholarship will never be 
entirely abandoned. As long as judges can transfer millions of dollars, 
or give orders to people with guns, the temptation for scholars to de-
bate or analyze their statements will be irresistible. Conceivably, how-
ever, such topical colloquy will be seen as a subsidiary mode of 
scholarship, and the consistent exploration of normative premises will 
replace it as the dominant mode of discourse. While legal scholarship 
would continue to relate its findings to current legislation or court de-
cisions, it would set its agenda for research internally, rather than re-
acting to external events. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite its current malaise, legal scholarship is not really in such a 
parlous state as many of its practitioners believe. In response to the 
decline of formalism, it has developed a new voice, an essentially pre-
scriptive approach that acknowledges its normative basis. Contempo-
rary legal scholars are now generally aware that their work consists of 
recommendations addressed to legal decision-makers, recommenda-
tions that are ultimately derived from value judgments rather than ob-
jective truth. In this sense, they have already arrived at the general 
conclusion that contemporary philosophy suggests for other fields. 
The great defect in legal scholarship is that scholars tend to speak 
the way judges do, that they have adopted a unified discourse with 
their subject matter. This prevents them from addressing the legal de-
cision-makers, specifically legislators and administrators, who are in 
fact more important in the modem state. In addition, it prevents them 
from developing a distinctive voice, and an independent research 
agenda, that would constitute a more relevant contribution, even for 
the judiciary. What the contemporary critique of methodology can 
contribute, therefore, is not an attack on positivism, but a heightened 
sense of self-awareness. By becoming more conscious of the nature of 
their discourse, legal scholars can continue the process of developing 
an autonomous scholarly tradition. It is this process, rather than the 
critical legal studies, law and literature, or law as practical reason 
movements, that represents the real message of modem philosophy for 
legal scholarship. 
The scholarly discourse which this philosophy suggests is one that 
begins from clearly articulated norms. The purpose of the scholarship 
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is" not to disprove everyone else's norms, but to elaborate the implica-
tions of one's own. These elaborations are both legal and empirical; 
they employ a range of methodologies to translate the norm into a 
legal context, and to generate or organize empirical data. The elabora-
tion process has cumulative properties, although only within the ambit 
of the chosen norm. At the same time, it constitutes a research 
agenda; topics are generated by the interaction of the norms with gen-
eral social trends, rather than by yesterday's statute or decision. In 
this way, legal scholars can develop a discourse that speaks effectively 
to modern decision-makers, and thus fulfills the purpose that the field 
has created for itself. 
